Luke Scott v. J. Lizarraga
699 F. App'x 713
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 1988 Scott was convicted in California state court of first-degree murder, robbery, extortion, and burglary; the Court of Appeal reversed the extortion conviction on direct review in 1990.
- The trial court did not amend its judgment to reflect the reversed extortion count until 2013, when it filed amended abstracts of judgment: one reflecting life without parole for murder and another listing robbery and burglary (no extortion).
- Scott filed a federal habeas petition before the amended judgment (denied in 2003) and filed a second federal habeas petition in 2014 after the 2013 amended judgment.
- The district court dismissed the 2014 petition as an unauthorized “second or successive” petition under AEDPA § 2244(b), treating the 2013 amendment as merely correcting a clerical error.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the 2013 amended judgment was an intervening new judgment (not a clerical correction) and therefore the 2014 petition was not “second or successive.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2014 habeas petition is “second or successive” under § 2244(b) | Scott: the 2013 amended judgment created a new, intervening judgment so the 2014 petition is not second or successive | Respondent: the 2013 amendment merely corrected a clerical error implementing the 1990 appellate decision, so the petition is second or successive | Court: The 2013 amended judgment was a new intervening judgment (not merely clerical); 2014 petition is not second or successive |
| Whether the trial court’s delay in entering the amended judgment changes the analysis | Scott: delay is irrelevant; the operative event is the entry of the amended judgment | Respondent: delay shows the amendment merely implemented an earlier appellate order and was clerical | Court: Delay does not change the focus; the entry of a new judgment is dispositive |
| Whether the error corrected by the amended judgment was clerical | Scott: elimination of an extortion conviction meaningfully altered the judgment and was not clerical | Respondent: omission reflected a failure to implement the 1990 appellate mandate (clerical) | Court: Removing a conviction materially altered rights; not a clerical correction |
| When AEDPA’s limitations and “second or successive” rules begin to run in these circumstances | Scott: limitations and successive rules hinge on the trial court’s amended judgment entry | Respondent: (implicit) challenges based on original judgment timing | Court: The relevant event is the trial court’s entry of judgment; an intervening amended judgment resets the analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (an intervening new state-court judgment means a later habeas application is not "second or successive")
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (distinguishing second-in-time petitions when a new judgment intervenes)
- Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) (amended judgment that leaves other convictions unchanged can still create a new judgment for § 2244(b) purposes)
- In re Candelario, 3 Cal.3d 702 (1970) (distinguishes clerical amendments from substantive modifications of judgment)
- Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2017) (concurrence notes that amendments correcting mathematical or similar errors can permit what would otherwise be a second or successive petition)