Luis Virgilio v. Terrabrook Vista Lakes, L.P.
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10094
| 11th Cir. | 2012Background
- This is a class action by Luis and Norma Virgilio and others who bought homes in Ryland’s Newport subdivision (Vista Lakes, Orlando, Florida).
- Pinecastle, adjacent to Newport and used as a WWII bombing range, contained unexploded ordnance and related materials; buyers were unaware of Pinecastle at purchase.
- Plaintiffs allege defects in disclosure and seek damages for loss of property value; Count 2 seeks 1.5% of purchase prices as unjust enrichment, Count 1/3/4 seek damages under various theories.
- District Court dismissed Counts 1, 2, 3 with prejudice or without prejudice and granted summary judgment on Count 4 in favor of Defendants.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviews de novo and affirms the district court’s judgments, holding no duty to disclose existed under Florida law for Counts 1, 3, and 4 and that Count 2 fails on unjust enrichment grounds.
- Florida law governs; Johnson v. Davis sets a duty to disclose known material facts not readily observable; the court analyzes whether Defendants owed such a duty here and whether a broader duty could extend to marketing entities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Defendants owed a Johnson v. Davis duty to disclose Pinecastle. | Virgilio argues Defendants acted as Ryland’s agents and had a disclosure duty. | Ryland and the marketing entities did not have a duty to disclose under Johnson beyond privity/agency with the seller. | Count 1 properly dismissed; no extension of Johnson duty to Defendants. |
| Whether unjust enrichment lies where Plaintiffs seek recovery of a marketing-fee-based benefit. | Plaintiffs claim they indirectly conferred a benefit via Ryland’s payment of the 1.5% fee. | Benefit was conferred to Defendants by Ryland’s contract; plaintiffs do not recover against the developers. | Count 2 properly dismissed; no unjust enrichment. |
| Whether FDUTPA claim survives where the asserted duty to disclose does not exist. | Count 3 should survive if FDUTPA can apply without a discrete duty to disclose. | Count 3 fails because the asserted duty to disclose does not exist under Florida law. | Count 3 properly dismissed. |
| Whether summary judgment on Count 4 for negligence was proper given duty analysis and discovery issues. | Rule 56(f) contemplates discovery to address duty; Florida foreseeability dictates duty in some cases. | No duty to disclose exists; economic-loss-only claim lacks a duty and discovery would not alter the legal question. | Summary judgment affirmed; no independent Florida duty to inform before contracting with Ryland. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (seller’s duty to disclose known, non-observable facts affecting value in home sales)
- Rayner v. Wise Realty Co. of Tallahassee, 504 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (extension of Johnson’s duty to real estate brokers)
- Revitz v. Terrell, 572 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (further development of Johnson’s duty doctrine)
- McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992) (economic-loss duty considerations in Florida negligence)
- Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Winter Park, 887 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 2004) (economic loss rule and duty considerations as gatekeeping in negligence)
- Indemnity Insurance Co. of N.H. v. American Aviation, 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004) (duty analysis in economic-loss contexts)
- Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sandcastle Beach Joint Venture, 498 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (discussion of Florida’s discovery and duty principles in claims)
- Gldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1990) (agency control element for actual agency)
