Luis v. United States
136 S. Ct. 1083
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Petitioner Sila Luis was indicted for health-care fraud; the government alleged $45 million in improper Medicare payments and sought a pretrial restraining order under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 to preserve substitute (untainted) assets.
- The district court issued a restraining order preventing Luis from dissipating up to $45 million of her assets; she challenged the order as violating her Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of choice.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Government may freeze a defendant’s untainted (substitute) assets pretrial to secure potential forfeiture.
- A plurality held that pretrial freezes of untainted assets can violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment on original-meaning and common-law grounds.
- Chief dissents (Kennedy, joined by Alito; and Kagan) argued Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale control and permit pretrial restraint of forfeitable assets when there is probable cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sixth Amendment bars pretrial freezing of a defendant's untainted (substitute) assets needed to hire counsel | Luis: freezing untainted assets deprives defendants of funds necessary to obtain counsel of choice, violating the Sixth Amendment as historically understood | Gov: pretrial restraint of forfeitable assets is permissible after probable cause to believe they will be forfeited; defendants can still obtain counsel on contingent-fee or other arrangements (Monsanto, Caplin) | Plurality: pretrial freeze of untainted assets infringes Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; Thomas concurs on textual/common-law grounds; dissent disagrees and would affirm restraint permissibility |
| Whether existing precedents (Caplin & Drysdale; Monsanto) permit pretrial restraint of substitute assets | Luis: those cases do not support freezing truly untainted property that still belongs to defendant pre-conviction | Gov: Caplin and Monsanto allow pretrial restraints of assets that will be forfeitable to protect recovery and prevent dissipation | Dissent: Caplin and Monsanto control and permit restraint after probable cause; plurality distinguishes tainted v. untainted assets and rejects automatic application of those precedents |
| Whether common-law history distinguishes tainted (forfeitable) and untainted assets for pretrial restraints | Luis: common law protected untainted property pre-conviction and allowed seizure only of tainted res; that history limits government power | Gov: relation-back doctrines and forfeiture traditions support pretrial restraint to secure recovery; title vests on conviction but probable-cause-based restraints are justified | Plurality/Thomas: rely on common-law line—tainted assets may be seized pretrial; untainted may not; Thomas emphasizes original meaning; dissent rejects this distinction as controlling |
| Practical/fairness concerns: fungibility and incentives created by rule | Luis: protecting untainted assets prevents perverse incentive to spend stolen proceeds first and undermines right to counsel | Gov: rule creates perverse incentives and benefits sophisticated criminals; restraint is needed to preserve victims’ recovery and prevent dissipation | Court divided: plurality accepts protection for untainted assets despite fungibility concerns; dissent warns of perverse incentives and practical difficulties |
Key Cases Cited
- Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (post-conviction forfeiture interest justifies denying use of forfeitable assets for counsel fees)
- United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) (after probable cause established, pretrial restraint of assets to prevent dissipation does not violate Sixth Amendment)
- United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (in rem forfeiture tradition and the need for nexus between property and crime)
- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair opportunity to secure counsel of choice)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (the right to select counsel of one's choice is a fundamental Sixth Amendment protection)
- Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (historical understanding that Sixth Amendment secured right to employ counsel)
- Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (lack of historical precedent is probative of constitutional problems)
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) (broad government powers may defeat protected rights; used analogically)