Luis Ruiz Sierra v. State
501 S.W.3d 179
Tex. App.2016Background
- Luis Ruiz Sierra was indicted for burglary alleging he "remained concealed in a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault," tracking Penal Code §30.02(a)(2).
- He pleaded guilty without a negotiated sentence; plea paperwork listed potential range as 5–99 years or life.
- At punishment, the trial court sentenced Sierra to 30 years imprisonment; Sierra did not object at trial.
- The State argued on appeal the sentence could be first-degree because Penal Code §30.02(d) converts habitation burglaries to first-degree when “any party” entered with intent to commit a non-theft felony (invoking party liability).
- Sierra argued the indictment charged only the §30.02(a) concealment offense (a second-degree felony), so the 30-year sentence exceeded the authorized maximum (20 years).
- The court held the indictment did not charge the elements of the first-degree (§30.02(d)) offense; party-law proof cannot substitute for alleging the charged offense, so the 30-year sentence was illegal and case remanded for resentencing under §30.02(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 30-year sentence was unauthorized because the indictment charged burglary by concealment (§30.02(a)), a second-degree felony | Sierra: indictment charged concealment with intent to commit sexual assault—second-degree max 20 years | State: §30.02(d) elevates habitation burglary to first-degree if “any party” entered with intent; party liability need not be alleged so evidence could support first-degree punishment | Held: Indictment did not allege the §30.02(d) elements; sentence exceeded authorized range and was illegal — reversed and remanded for resentencing under §30.02(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (indictment must provide plain, intelligible notice of the charged offense)
- Thomason v. State, 892 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (facially charging a complete offense confines the State to that offense)
- Kirkpatrick v. State, 279 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (critical inquiry is whether the indictment identifies the penal-code provision alleged)
- Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (sentences outside statutory range are illegal and may be corrected anytime)
- Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (remedy for non-negotiated guilty plea producing illegal sentence is remand for proper punishment assessment)
- DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (distinguishing burglary by entry vs. concealment and intent timing)
- Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (law of parties may be proven though not alleged, but cannot cure failure to charge the offense in the indictment)