Luis Estrada v. State, 05-16-00883-CR

Appellant Luis Estrada (grandfather) lived with his daughter (Mother) and her four young sons; incident occurred June 15–16, 2015 while Mother was at the ER and the other children were asleep.
The complainant, D.F.V., age four at the time, reported appellant made him touch appellant’s penis and inserted a finger in D.F.V.’s anus; he told family members and a forensic interviewer, saying appellant claimed he was “sleepwalking.”
A sexual assault nurse examiner found no physical trauma but testified absence of trauma is not uncommon in such cases.
Appellant initially denied contact, then admitted touching the child’s penis and scrotum under clothing and said he was “just playing,” but denied anal penetration and denied making the child touch his penis.
A jury convicted Estrada of aggravated sexual assault of a child (penetration by finger) and two counts of indecency with a child by contact; concurrent sentences were imposed and Estrada appealed arguing insufficiency of the evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated sexual assault (finger anal penetration)	State: Child’s testimony, consistent outcry to mother and interviewer, and nurse’s testimony that lack of trauma is common, are sufficient	Estrada: No physical trauma and act was not witnessed by anyone other than the child, so evidence is insufficient	Court: Overruled — child’s testimony alone can support conviction; nurse explained lack of trauma is not uncommon, and testimony was consistent
Sufficiency of evidence for indecency with a child (touching genitals and causing child to touch his genitals with intent to arouse)	State: Intent may be inferred from surrounding circumstances (timing, secrecy, admissions, sleepwalking claim, conduct)	Estrada: No direct evidence of intent to arouse or gratify; record lacks circumstantial proof of sexual purpose	Court: Overruled — intent may be inferred from conduct and circumstances (waiting until children asleep, telling child he was sleepwalking, inconsistent statements, admission of touching); sufficient evidence

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (deference to factfinder on conflicts and inferences)
Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (child’s testimony alone can support sexual abuse conviction)
Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (intent usually proved by circumstantial evidence)
McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (intent to arouse may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances)
Connell v. State, 233 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007) (conduct alone can suffice to infer sexual intent)