Luis A. Montes-Valeton v. State of Florida, 216 So. 3d 475

Montes-Valeton was involved in a single-vehicle crash with a fatality; Sergeant Tejera first responded and smelled alcohol on Montes-Valeton but did not communicate that observation to other officers.
Trooper Victor Molina became the lead investigator, spoke to Montes-Valeton, read implied-consent warnings from the blood-draw kit, and obtained a signed written consent for a blood draw performed by fire rescue.
Molina testified at trial he did not detect an odor of alcohol and could not recall signs of impairment; Tejera’s observations were not shown to have been communicated to Molina.
Montes-Valeton moved to suppress the blood test, arguing Molina lacked probable cause under section 316.1933(1)(a); trial court denied the motion and the jury convicted Montes-Valeton of DUI causing serious bodily injury.
The Third District affirmed, holding the blood draw was voluntary consent and, alternatively, supported by probable cause under the fellow officer rule based on Tejera’s observations.
Florida Supreme Court granted review and quashed the Third District: it held the fellow officer rule did not apply because there was no communication of Tejera’s observations to Molina, and Montes-Valeton’s consent was involuntary because Molina threatened license suspension based on implied-consent warnings that did not validly apply.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether fellow officer rule supplied probable cause to Molina for the blood draw	Tejera’s observations of intoxication imputed to Molina under the fellow officer rule, so Molina had probable cause	Fellow officer rule applies because officers were engaged in the same investigation and had general communications	No. Fellow officer rule requires communication of the probable-cause information to the acting officer; Tejera’s observations were not communicated to Molina, so no imputed probable cause
Whether Montes-Valeton’s written consent to the blood draw was voluntary	Consent was voluntary and valid after Molina read implied-consent warnings and obtained a signed form	Consent was voluntary; implied-consent warnings authorized by statute supported voluntariness	No. Molina lacked probable cause under the statute so implied-consent warnings did not apply; threatening license suspension rendered the consent involuntary under the totality of circumstances

Voorhees v. State, 699 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1997) (fellow officer rule permits reliance on another officer’s communicated probable cause)
Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1995) (collective knowledge doctrine requires communication to enable action by another officer)
State v. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012) (fellow officer rule justified to allow on-scene officers to act on fellow officers’ communicated information)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent to search must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances)