546 S.W.3d 47
Tenn. Ct. App.2018Background
- March 6, 2018: Metropolitan Nashville Mayor resigned; Metropolitan Clerk notified Davidson County Administrator of Elections of the vacancy.
- March 9, 2018: Davidson County Election Commission voted 3–2 to schedule the mayoral vacancy election for August 2, 2018 (a municipal primary/general election date), and declined to seek judicial guidance or set the May 1, 2018 date.
- March 12–14, 2018: Ludye N. Wallace (qualified mayoral candidate) filed for certiorari, mandamus, and declaratory relief seeking to void the Commission’s action and require a special election under Charter § 15.03 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-14-102; trial court denied relief and upheld the August 2 date.
- Wallace sought review in the Tennessee Supreme Court; the Court accepted expedited review and framed the issue as the meaning of “general metropolitan election” in Charter § 15.03.
- The charter provision distinguishes between a limited term “general metropolitan election” (August of every fourth odd-numbered year for Mayor, Vice Mayor, council members) and broader “general election” language used elsewhere.
- Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the chancery court: held § 15.03’s phrase “general metropolitan election” means the charter’s August 2019 mayoral election; because that date is more than 12 months after the vacancy, the Charter requires a special election to fill the unexpired mayoral term, and the Commission erred in setting August 2, 2018.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wallace) | Defendant's Argument (Metro/Commission) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Charter § 15.03 requires a special metropolitan election to fill a mayoral vacancy occurring more than 12 months before the next “general metropolitan election” | “General metropolitan election” refers to the charter’s specific mayoral/general-metropolitan cycle (next such date is Aug. 1, 2019), so vacancy >12 months requires a special election | Any municipal general election (including Aug. 2, 2018 municipal election) is a “general metropolitan election”; because Aug. 2, 2018 is <12 months from vacancy, no special election required | Court held the phrase means the charter’s specific mayoral general-metropolitan election (Aug. 2019); therefore a special election is required |
| Whether the Commission’s action setting Aug. 2, 2018 was a proper exercise of discretion or contrary to ministerial duty under the Charter and state law | Commission violated Charter § 15.03 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-14-102 by setting Aug. 2, 2018; mandamus/declaratory relief appropriate | Commission acted within discretion to set the election on Aug. 2, 2018 | Court ordered Commission to set a special election under Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-14-102; Commission’s Aug. 2 date invalid |
| Whether the phrase “general metropolitan election” is ambiguous and entitled to deference to the Commission’s interpretation | Phrase is unambiguous given Charter context and drafters’ use; no deference owed | Commission’s interpretation merits deference | Court found the phrase unambiguous, declined deference, and construed it narrowly to mean the charter’s mayoral election cycle |
| Whether prior precedent (State ex rel. Wise v. Judd) required a contrary result | Wallace: Wise did not decide this specific phrase distinction | Metro/Commission: Wise supports treating different municipal elections as qualifying | Court distinguished Wise as addressing a different Charter phrase and issue; Wise did not resolve § 15.03’s phrases |
Key Cases Cited
- McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. 1990) (same inquiry applies regardless of procedural vehicle used to challenge administrative action)
- State ex rel. Wise v. Judd, 655 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1983) (addressed meaning of "preceding general election" in a different Charter context; court distinguished it)
- Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (statutory/charter interpretation principles: give words their ordinary meaning and discern legislative intent)
- Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506 (Tenn. 2017) (questions of law, including statutory construction, reviewed de novo)