Lucky Iromuanya v. Scott Frakes, 866 F.3d 872

Background

In April 2004 Lucky Iromuanya fired a handgun at Nolan Jenkins at a college party; the bullet passed through Jenkins and killed Jenna Cooper. Iromuanya was arrested the same day and gave a videotaped statement saying he intended only to scare, not to hit anyone.
At trial the court convicted Iromuanya of attempted second-degree murder (Jenkins), second-degree murder (Cooper), and weapons offenses; total sentence aggregated to 70 years to life.
Trial jury instructions: manslaughter was given as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder in a "step" instruction (considered only if acquitted of second-degree murder), but the jury was told it could not consider sudden-quarrel provocation on the attempted second-degree-murder charge; attempted sudden-quarrel manslaughter was not instructed as a lesser included offense for the attempt charge.
Nebraska appellate decisions at the time (post-1994 and pre-2011) treated manslaughter on sudden quarrel as unintentional, so attempted sudden-quarrel manslaughter did not legally exist and absence of provocation was not an element of second-degree murder.
Iromuanya pursued direct appeal and postconviction relief in state court (both denied); he then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition arguing due process error in jury instructions and ineffective assistance for failing to challenge instructions and during plea negotiations.
The district court denied relief; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the Nebraska Supreme Court’s adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and that the instructions did not so infect the trial as to violate due process.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether precluding consideration of sudden-quarrel provocation on the attempted second-degree murder charge (and using a step instruction for manslaughter) violated due process	Iromuanya: step instruction and barring sudden-quarrel on attempt relieved State of burden and violated Winship/Mullaney principles	State: under Nebraska law at trial time manslaughter upon sudden quarrel was unintentional, so sudden quarrel did not negate an element of second-degree murder; step instruction matched state law	Held: No due process violation; state law at the time made the step instruction correct and its adjudication was reasonable under AEDPA
Whether the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of sudden-quarrel provocation	Iromuanya: absence of provocation negates an element and so must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt	State: absence of provocation was not an element of second-degree murder in Nebraska in 2004	Held: State was not relieved of its burden; Winship not implicated because sudden quarrel did not negate an element under controlling state law then
Whether attempted sudden-quarrel manslaughter was a cognizable lesser included offense for the attempt charge	Iromuanya: jury should have been allowed to consider attempted sudden-quarrel manslaughter	State: attempted voluntary manslaughter did not exist in Nebraska then because manslaughter was treated as unintentional; one cannot attempt an unintentional crime	Held: No error in excluding attempted sudden-quarrel manslaughter; it did not exist under Nebraska law at trial time
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to anticipate later changes in Nebraska law and for not objecting to instructions	Iromuanya: counsel should have challenged the instructions and anticipated changes (e.g., Ronald Smith)	State: counsel’s performance was not deficient under Strickland given the law at trial time; failure to predict later overruling is not ineffective assistance	Held: Counsel not ineffective; Nebraska court’s rejection was not an unreasonable application of Strickland

Key Cases Cited

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged)
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (State may not shift burden to defendant to prove an element-equivalent “heat of passion” lowering murder to manslaughter)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (States may allocate burden of proving an affirmative defense to defendant where the defense does not negate an element)
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (upholds state allocation of burden for self-defense; dicta warns that excluding consideration of defense evidence from reasonable-doubt inquiry would violate Winship)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (habeas relief for state-law jury instruction error only when instruction so infects trial as to violate due process)
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (identifies standard for instructional error to violate due process)
Bounds v. Delo, 151 F.3d 1116 (8th Cir. 1998) (states define elements of their crimes)