Lucas v. United States, 305 A.3d 774

On Nov. 7, 2020 Antonio Lucas and an accomplice robbed Xavier Scott outside Addison Road Metro (Maryland), then boarded a District-bound Metro train.
Video showed Lucas carrying Scott’s black jacket; police arrested Lucas at L’Enfant Plaza (D.C.) within ~25 minutes.
Officers recovered Scott’s credit cards and cell phone from Lucas’s pocket and found Scott’s jacket on Lucas’s arm.
Lucas was charged in D.C. with Receiving Stolen Property (RSP), D.C. Code § 22-3232, and moved to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction, arguing he took possession in Maryland.
Trial court denied the motion; after a bench trial Lucas was convicted and sentenced; he appealed, challenging whether he “possessed” stolen property in the District within the meaning of § 22-3232.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of “possesses” in § 22-3232	“Possesses” includes being in possession in the forum regardless of where property was acquired	“Possesses” means the act of taking possession; because Lucas took the property in Maryland, D.C. cannot convict	“Possesses” means having possession (not only taking); possession in D.C. suffices for RSP conviction
Territorial jurisdiction for RSP	Possession in D.C. establishes offense jurisdiction even if acquisition occurred elsewhere	The alleged offense occurred in Maryland where property was taken	D.C. has jurisdiction because Lucas possessed stolen property in the District while knowing it was stolen
Use of statutory title and noscitur a sociis	Plain meaning and context control; legislative history shows intent to cover continued possession	Title/noscitur a sociis narrow “possesses” to mean acquisition only	Court rejected title and noscitur a sociis arguments, relying on ordinary meaning and legislative history
Government’s alternative reliance on D.C. Code § 22-1808	Government (for first time on appeal) argued § 22-1808 supplies jurisdiction	Defense contested retroactive invocation/charging issues	Court did not need to reach § 22-1808; noted § 22-1808 shouldn’t be invoked retroactively to cure uncharged jurisdictional defects and appears to be a substantive offense

Reese v. Newman, 131 A.3d 880 (D.C. 2016) (start with plain statutory language when interpreting statute)
Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123 (D.C. 2010) (use dictionary/ordinary meaning when statute is undefined)
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1979) (words take their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning absent definition)
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (U.S. 2010) (declined to apply noscitur a sociis where statutory term unambiguous)
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2015) (canons of construction cannot defeat clear statutory definitions)
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (U.S. 2019) (dual-sovereignty exception to double jeopardy)
Hayes v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1985) (state court holding out-of-state acquisition plus transport into forum can support RSP)
State v. Red Kettle, 476 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1991) (similar holding on cross-jurisdictional possession)
Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1991) (upholding RSP conviction based on possession in D.C.)