LRC Realty, Inc. v. B.E.B. Properties (Slip Opinion), 2020 Ohio 3196

In 1994 B.E.B. Properties leased a portion of its Chardon, Ohio property to Northern Ohio Cellular and recorded the lease and an easement; a cell tower was erected on the site.
In 1995 B.E.B. sold the property to Baker and Cyvas; shortly thereafter two partners assigned partnership interests to Bruce and Sheila Bird, who understood the assignment to include the right to future tower rent.
The Birds received annual rental payments from the tower owner and its successor (New Par) for years, including payments after later transfers of the land to Parker Court and then to appellant LRC Realty in 2013.
LRC Realty sued in 2014 seeking a declaration that it was entitled to future and certain past rental payments; the Birds counterclaimed, seeking declaration and deed reformation.
The trial court split relief; the Eleventh District Court of Appeals held the deed language reserved rent to B.E.B. (and thus to the Birds) and remanded for entry of judgment for the Birds.
The Ohio Supreme Court granted review to decide whether rents run with the land absent an express reservation and whether the deed’s wording here reserved the right to future rental payments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (LRC)	Defendant's Argument (Birds)	Held
Does the right to receive rents run with the land absent an express reservation in the deed?	Rents run with the land and follow title; no reservation in the deed.	Historically rents can be reserved but only by explicit reservation language; Birds claimed they obtained an assignment.	Court reaffirmed: absent an express reservation, the right to receive rents runs with the land and follows legal title.
Does the deed phrase “subject to the specific encumbrances on the premises as set forth above” reserve the grantor’s right to receive future rental payments?	That generic language does not reserve rent; the deed contains no words reserving rental payments.	The phrase references the recorded lease/easement and thus effectively reserves the right to receive rent for the grantor (and assignees).	Court held the phrase was insufficient to reserve rental rights; no reservation of rent appeared in the deed, so Birds had no assignable right.
Are remaining equitable defenses or other factual issues resolved by this ruling?	LRC sought recognition of its title-right to rents and further proceedings to resolve equitable issues.	Birds urged equitable considerations based on conduct and long receipt of payments.	Court reversed the Eleventh District and remanded for consideration of unresolved equitable defenses and related factual matters.

Smith v. Harrison, 42 Ohio St. 180 (1884) (establishes that a covenant to pay rent ran with the land under common law)
Commercial Bank & Savs. Co. v. Woodville Savs. Bank Co., 126 Ohio St. 587 (1933) (right to rents and profits ordinarily follows legal title)
Liberal S. & L. Co. v. Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489 (1940) (exception where grantor expressly reserves rental right in deed)
Smith v. Barrick, 151 Ohio St. 201 (1949) (one cannot assign an interest one does not possess)
Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295 (1906) (typical reservation language uses words like “reserve,” “except,” or equivalent)
Koprivec v. Rails-To-Trails of Wayne Cty., 153 Ohio St.3d 137 (2018) (deed interpretation focuses on parties’ intent and plain language within the four corners)
Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388 (2000) (de novo review applies to summary-judgment rulings)