Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach
133 S. Ct. 735
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- Lozman bought a 60-by-12-foot floating home that was unself-propelled and moored at a Florida marina.
- City filed in rem admiralty for dockage and trespass damages under the Federal Maritime Lien Act.
- District Court treated the float as a vessel and awarded dockage and nominal trespass damages.
- Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the structure was a vessel based on capability to move under tow and lack of permanent mooring as evidence of transport function.
- Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Lozman’s floating home falls within §3’s vessel definition and to clarify the proper test for “capable of being used … as a means of transportation on water.”
- The Court held the floating home is not a vessel because it lacks a practical transportation function and is not designed for transporting people or cargo on water.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lozman’s floating home is a vessel under §3. | Lozman contends the home is not a vessel. | City asserts it is a vessel because it can float and be towed. | Not a vessel. |
| What standard defines ‘capable of being used … as a means of transportation on water.’ | Narrow construction consistent with maritime history should classify close cases as vessels. | Broad interpretation of ‘capable’ supports vessel status in more cases. | Practical capability test applied; not every floating structure is a vessel. |
| Whether subjective owner intent should drive vessel status. | Intent to moor indefinitely should not determine status. | Intent is not used; objective characteristics govern. | Subjective intent excluded; objective evidence used. |
| Whether the case should be remanded for further factfinding after applying the correct standard. | Remand could develop record to determine maritime function. | Record is sufficient for ruling; remand unnecessary. | No remand; Court reached decision on the record. |
Key Cases Cited
- Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19 (1926) (wharfboat not a vessel despite towability and movement; not used for transportation between places)
- Stewart v. Dutra Constru. Co., 543 U. S. 481 (2005) (vessel status requires practical transportation use; not theoretical)
- Cope v. Valletta Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625 (1887) (structure used for navigation; examine purpose and movement)
- The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213 (1867) (permanently moored structures may be nonvessels; context matters)
- Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U. S. 527 (1995) (a craft may be a vessel if its purpose includes transportation; functional analysis)
- The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17 (1903) (self-propulsion not strictly required for vessel status; transportation function matters)
- Kathriner v. Unisea, Inc., 975 F.2d 657 (1992) (dead ships and major alterations can remove vessel status)
- Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co. (second citation in opinion), 543 U. S. 481 (2005) (reiterates practical capacity and transportation function)