92 F. Supp. 3d 76
E.D.N.Y2015Background
- On April 28, 2009 Melissa Lozada wrecked her car; Wantagh volunteer EMTs (Baranowski, Hutchison) and Wantagh chiefs (Lindgren, Jackowitz) and two NY State Troopers (Nolan, Weilminster) responded.
- EMTs concluded Lozada was agitated/possibly medically impaired; she refused transport and refused to sign the PCR/RMA (refusal-of-medical-attention) form after being asked multiple times.
- Wantagh personnel asked a trooper to witness the RMA refusal; Trooper Nolan approached Lozada, warned her to stop yelling or face arrest, and arrested her for disorderly conduct; Weilminster assisted in handcuffing.
- Lozada alleges she was calmly seated, was grabbed/forcibly removed from her vehicle, hit her head, and suffered bruising; she later sought treatment and the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed as facially insufficient.
- Lozada sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments) and state law; State Defendants and Fire District Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| False arrest (Fourth Amendment) | Lozada: arrest lacked probable cause; it followed her refusal to sign RMA | State: troopers had probable cause based on EMT reports and Lozada’s conduct; Fire District: only requested assistance | Court: genuine issue of fact for troopers — denial of summary judgment; Fire Districts granted summary judgment (no instigation/conspiracy) |
| Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) | Lozada: trooper grabbed/dragged her out of car, pushed her to ground, unnecessary handcuffing causing injury | State: force was minimal, routine handcuffing, quickly removed | Court: disputed facts permit reasonable jury to find troopers used excessive force — denial of summary judgment for troopers; Fire Districts granted summary judgment (no personal involvement) |
| First Amendment retaliation | Lozada: arrested for refusing to sign RMA / exercising speech/refusal rights | State: legitimate law enforcement motive (disorderly conduct); no improper retaliatory motive | Court: Nolan — triable issue on retaliatory motive and injury (denied summary judgment); Weilminster — grant summary judgment in his favor |
| Malicious prosecution | Lozada: prosecution (desk appearance ticket) was retaliatory and lacked probable cause; ended in her favor | Defendants: probable cause; dismissal was for facial insufficiency and not a favorable termination | Court: dismissal for facial insufficiency not a favorable termination — summary judgment for State Defendants and Fire Districts on malicious prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary-judgment standard)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom causal link)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (objective probable-cause inquiry)
- Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146 (2d Cir.) (probable cause for disorderly conduct requires intent/recklessness as to public inconvenience)
- Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir.) (probable cause is complete defense to false arrest)
- Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.) (factors for excessive-force analysis)