Lovin v. Cherokee Cty.Â
248 N.C. App. 527
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Ronald Keith Lovin served ~24 years under TSERS (state trooper/police) and ~12 years under LGERS (sheriff). He began receiving TSERS retirement benefits in 2009, before his sheriff term ended.
- Lovin retired as Cherokee County sheriff in January 2015 and applied for the special separation allowance under N.C.G.S. § 143-166.42.
- Cherokee County paid the allowance only for ~12 years of LGERS service, excluding the ~24 years of TSERS service because Lovin was not a TSERS member at retirement.
- Lovin sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that his special separation allowance should be calculated on 36 years (TSERS + LGERS) of creditable service.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Lovin, ordering the allowance computed on 36 years. Defendants appealed; the Court of Appeals reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "creditable service" under N.C.G.S. § 143-166.42 includes prior TSERS service when the officer is not a TSERS member at retirement | Lovin: "Creditable service" should include service for which credit was earned (even if earned while in a different system) — i.e., total service (TSERS + LGERS) | Defendants: "Creditable service" means service allowed under the retirement system of which the officer is a member at retirement; Lovin was not a TSERS member at retirement, so TSERS service is excluded | Court: Reversed. "Creditable service" is defined by reference to the retirement system of which the retiree is a member; because Lovin was not a TSERS member when he retired, TSERS service is excluded; allowance based only on LGERS membership service (~12 years). |
Key Cases Cited
- Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (procedural rule on entry of final judgment for appeal under Rule 54(b))
- Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 367 S.E.2d 655 (clear statutory language must be given its plain meaning)
- Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 451 S.E.2d 284 (statute clear on its face must be enforced as written)
- In re Appeal of Clayton-Marcus Co., Inc., 286 N.C. 215, 210 S.E.2d 199 (statutory definitions control interpretation)
- In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 669 S.E.2d 572 (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 649 S.E.2d 382 (summary judgment standard)