Lovell v. Duffey
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 156
6th Cir.2011Background
- Lovell was charged in April 2003 with aggravated drug trafficking and permitting drug abuse, carrying a mandatory one-to-five year prison term.
- The State offered a plea to reduced charges allowing probation; Lovell rejected and went to trial, resulting in a one-year sentence plus six months concurrent.
- Lovell later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to explain that trial conviction would carry mandatory prison time while the plea would avoid it.
- She filed a motion for a new trial; Ohio courts denied, then affirmed on direct appeal and later on postconviction review, ultimately declining to disturb the conviction.
- In September 2007 Lovell petitioned for habeas relief; the district court granted a conditional writ for resentencing under the plea, which the Sixth Circuit later reversed.
- The Sixth Circuit held that the state court’s Strickland-based denial was not unreasonable under AEDPA and reinstated Lovell’s conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient | Lovell contends counsel failed to explain sentencing exposure. | Duffey argues counsel conveyed the plea details and Lovell understood consequences. | No; court found error not clearly unreasonable given the record. |
| Whether prejudice established a reasonable likelihood Lovell would have accepted the plea | Lovell would have accepted the plea for probation if informed of consequences. | Duffey argues evidence supports Lovell’s rejection and lack of prejudice. | Yes; court held prejudice shown due to disparity between probation and mandatory sentence. |
| Whether AEDPA deference applies and if state court decision was reasonable | Lovell asserts new evidence at federal hearing undermines state court ruling; deference not applicable. | Duffey maintains AEDPA deference applies and decision was reasonable. | AEDPA deference applies; decision not unreasonable. |
| Whether the district court’s evidentiary findings were properly reviewed | Lovell argues deeper examination of counsel’s notes and demeanor warranted reversal. | Duffey argues appellate deference to state findings is appropriate. | Held within framework; no basis to overturn under AEDPA. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-pronged deficient performance and prejudice standard)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (AEDPA deference and unreasonable application standards)
- Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2003) (premise that counsel must discuss sentencing exposure and plea consequences)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (U.S. 2002) (unreasonable application standard under AEDPA)
- Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665 (10th Cir. 2006) (close AEDPA determinations and evidence standards)
- Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2005) (modified AEDPA deference framework)