Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848

Background

Six transgender Michigan residents challenge the Secretary of State’s 2011 policy requiring a certified amended birth certificate as the only proof to change the sex marker on a state driver’s license/ID.
Under Michigan and other states’ laws, some plaintiffs must undergo sex‑reassignment surgery (or cannot amend their birth certificates at all) to obtain an accurate ID; others can never obtain an accurate Michigan ID because their birth state prohibits amending the certificate.
Plaintiffs allege the Policy forces them to carry IDs that conflict with their gender presentation, thereby revealing their transgender status to strangers, causing stigma, harassment, and heightened risk of physical harm.
Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of substantive due process (informational privacy), free speech, equal protection, right to travel, and medical autonomy. Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The court found Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment informational‑privacy (substantive due process) claim and denied the motion to dismiss; the court declined to decide the remaining claims under judicial restraint and denied those portions without prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Policy violates substantive due process by forcing disclosure of transgender status (informational privacy)	Policy forces disclosure of intimate medical/status information that creates real risk of bodily harm and humiliation	Risks are speculative and differ from Kallstrom’s concrete threats; statutes protect record accuracy and law‑enforcement interests	Court: Plaintiffs plausibly allege a fundamental privacy interest (disclosure risks bodily harm); claim survives 12(b)(6) strict scrutiny inquiry at pleading stage
Whether the Policy is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest	Requiring amended birth certificate is not least restrictive and undermines accurate identification; many jurisdictions adopt less restrictive rules	Policy serves interests in accurate IDs and consistency with state records	Court: Defendant’s asserted interests are vague and Policy unlikely to be the least restrictive means; not resolved on merits but dismissal denied
Whether plaintiffs’ allegations of generalized statistics suffice to show risk of harm	Plaintiffs alleged individualized incidents plus well‑documented statistics showing hostility toward transgender people	Defendant: statistical/general risks are hypothetical and insufficient	Court: Plaintiffs pleaded specific incidents plus background evidence; plausibly alleges perceived likely threat per Kallstrom
Procedural: Whether case should be dismissed at pleading stage on other constitutional claims	Plaintiffs pleaded five constitutional claims but court should avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings	Defendant: all five claims lack constitutional dimension and should be dismissed	Court: declines to reach remaining constitutional claims under judicial restraint; denies dismissal without prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizes informational‑privacy interest where disclosure could lead to bodily harm)
Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998) (protects confidential, intimate sexual information from public dissemination)
Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (constitutional right to medical confidentiality for transsexuals given risk of hostility and violence)
United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998) (narrow tailoring requires least restrictive means analysis)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading required facts supporting claims)
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (substantive due process protects certain fundamental rights)
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognition of fundamental rights within substantive due process)