Louise Harris v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21075
11th Cir.2017Background
- Louise Harris, an Alabama inmate, was convicted of arranging the murder of her husband and originally sentenced to death; her death sentence was vacated on state postconviction for penalty-phase ineffective assistance and she was resentenced to life without parole.
- Before trial a rapid turnover of court-appointed attorneys occurred: Harris had at least nine different lawyers appointed, withdrawn, or relieved in roughly four months; Eric Bowen and Knox Argo tried the case after relatively limited capital experience and preparation time.
- At trial the State relied on testimony from co-conspirator Lorenzo McCarter and hired killers; evidence included life insurance policies naming Harris as beneficiary; Harris testified and denied culpability; the jury convicted.
- In state Rule 32 proceedings Harris first raised an ineffective assistance claim based on discontinuity of counsel (the "continuity of counsel" claim); Alabama courts deemed the claim procedurally defaulted because it could have been raised at trial.
- Harris filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing (1) cause and prejudice excused the procedural default because counsel were prevented by conflict from raising their own ineffectiveness, and (2) the lack of continuity prejudiced her guilt-phase defense by preventing development of trust and omission of mitigation/background evidence.
- The district court denied relief; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Harris demonstrated cause but failed to show Strickland prejudice causally linked to the turnover, so she could not overcome the procedural default nor prevail on the ineffective-assistance claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Harris can overcome procedural default of her continuity-of-counsel ineffective assistance claim by showing cause and prejudice | Revolving door of counsel (and counsel's conflict in alleging their own ineffectiveness) is an objective external factor supplying cause; turnover prejudiced the defense by preventing trust, investigation, and presentation of background/intellectual limitations | Claim is procedurally defaulted and, even if cognizable, Harris cannot show how turnover causally produced specific errors at trial or a reasonable probability of a different outcome | Court: Harris showed cause (conflict/external factor) but failed to prove Strickland prejudice causally linked to the turnover; procedural default not excused; petition denied |
| Whether discontinuity of counsel is a cognizable standalone Strickland claim | Continuity problems can amount to ineffective assistance when they cause a breakdown in defense sufficient to satisfy Strickland | Even if cognizable, plaintiff must prove specific causal link between turnover and deficient trial performance; general allegations insufficient | Court: Did not foreclose such a claim generally, but Harris failed to identify how earlier attorneys’ conduct caused specific trial errors by Bowen/Argo; no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes the two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (cause-and-prejudice standard for overcoming procedural default)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (limits cause from ineffective postconviction counsel; discusses imputation of state action)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (narrowly permits ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel to supply cause in certain cases)
- Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (conflict-of-interest principles; right to conflict-free counsel)
- Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991) (attorney self-interest can be an external objective factor supplying cause for procedural default)