Louis v. Hagel
221 F. Supp. 3d 40
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Valery Louis, an Afro‑American of Haitian origin, sued the Department of Defense (DISA component) under Title VII alleging race and national‑origin discrimination, hostile work environment, physical assaults (including being gassed and acid droplets) and constructive discharge after he resigned fearing for his safety.
- Louis also alleged DISA revoked his security classification (security clearance) after his resignation.
- Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction over the security‑clearance claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to the hostile‑work‑environment/assault allegations; Louis did not file an opposition to the motion.
- The administrative record includes Louis’s EEO charge (which referenced "other sheets") and the agency’s Determination Letter summarizing his claims as a hostile work environment culminating in constructive discharge following suspension of classified access.
- The agency’s Final Agency Decision discussed alleged assaults with acid and racial/national‑origin comments, suggesting the agency investigated those allegations.
- The court granted dismissal of claims relating to the security clearance but denied (without prejudice) dismissal for failure to exhaust as to the hostile‑work‑environment and constructive‑discharge claims, finding the agency had notice and had investigated the allegations and that the agency did not meet its burden to show failure to exhaust.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review revocation/suspension of security clearance | Louis treated revocation as an actionable adverse employment action underlying disparate treatment | Hagel (DOD) argued security‑clearance decisions are committed to executive discretion and nonjusticiable under Egan | Dismissed: security‑clearance claim nonjusticiable and dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) |
| Whether Louis exhausted administrative remedies for alleged racial/national‑origin epithets and physical assaults before filing suit | Louis contends he raised these matters in his EEO charge (referencing additional sheets) and the agency investigated them | Hagel contends the Determination Letter did not accept those specific allegations for investigation and Louis failed to contest the agency’s characterization, so he failed to exhaust | Denied (without prejudice): record shows agency had notice and investigated; agency failed to meet its burden to prove non‑exhaustion |
| Effect of Plaintiff’s failure to respond to motion to dismiss | Louis did not file responses or seek extension | Hagel argued unanswered arguments should be treated as conceded under local rules | Court noted possible concession but nevertheless ruled on merits: granted in part (clearance), denied in part (other claims) |
Key Cases Cited
- Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (security‑clearance decisions are committed to executive discretion and generally nonjusticiable)
- Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Egan bars judicial review of adverse employment actions based on clearance denial/revocation)
- Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (authority to issue security clearances is discretionary; clearance denial claims are committed to agency discretion)
- Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Title VII suit limited to claims like or reasonably related to EEO charge)
- Marshall v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 130 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (vague EEO charge will not satisfy exhaustion for claims it does not fairly embrace)
- Hendrix v. Napolitano, 77 F. Supp. 3d 188 (D.D.C. 2015) (discussing nonjusticiability of clearance revocation claims post‑Egan)
- Mokhtar v. Kerry, 83 F. Supp. 3d 49 (D.D.C. 2015) (agency, not employee, bears burden to develop administrative record; failure to object to agency acceptance letter not prerequisite to suit)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Rule 12(b)(1) standard: assume truth of material factual allegations but court may consider facts outside complaint)
