Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, 59 F.4th 1204

In 2008 Louis Clements pled guilty in Florida to lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years’ sexual-offender probation with a requirement to register under Fla. Stat. § 943.0435.
His probation expired in 2013, but Florida’s registration scheme imposes lifetime obligations: initial in-person registration, public disclosure of identifying info, in-person reporting at least every six months, 48-hour notice for many changes, and felony penalties for failures to report.
Clements filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 2017, arguing the registration and reporting requirements rendered him “in custody.”
The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the district court dismissed, finding the registration/reporting obligations mere collateral consequences.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Florida’s registration/reporting requirements alone satisfy the § 2254 “in custody” requirement, expressly declining to decide residency-buffer restrictions because they were not litigated below or supported by the record.
Holding: the court affirmed dismissal, concluding Florida’s registration and reporting obligations did not place Clements “in custody” for § 2254 purposes.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Florida’s sex‑offender registration and reporting requirements render a former probationer “in custody” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254	Clements: lifetime registration, frequent in‑person reporting, notice requirements and criminal penalties substantially restrain liberty and thus satisfy Jones’s “significant restraint” test	State: probation expired; remaining duties are collateral consequences, less onerous than parole/supervision and do not sufficiently restrain movement or liberty	Held: No — the registration/reporting duties, taken as a whole, are not severe enough to render Clements “in custody” when he filed his § 2254 petition
Whether the court should consider state/local residency‑restriction ordinances as part of the custody inquiry	Clements raised residency limits on appeal as additional restraints supporting custody	State: residency restrictions were not litigated below and factual record is undeveloped; they should not be considered	Held: Court declined to reach residency restrictions — they were not presented or developed in district court and thus are not before the court

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole can satisfy “in custody” where legal restraints significantly limit liberty)
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (once sentence fully expired, collateral consequences alone do not create custody)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (Alaska’s registration law not punitive; public disclosure and non‑supervisory duties leave freedom to live/work)
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) (no habeas relief where petitioner not under physical restraint)
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (release on recognizance can be “in custody” when freedom of movement is controlled by authorities)
Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984) (release pending retrial can be “in custody” due to court‑imposed restraints)
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (custody may extend to those released while appeals pending)
United States ex rel. Marcello v. Dist. Dir. of INS, New Orleans, 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1981) (immigration supervision with reporting and travel notice can be “in custody”)
Romero v. Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 20 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2021) (pre‑removal supervision with reporting and travel limits deemed “in custody”)
Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, Buck Cnty., Pa., 917 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2019) (Pennsylvania’s more onerous registration scheme found sufficient to create custody)