Loudesia Flanagan v. City of Richmond, 692 F. App'x 490

Background

Flanagan, a Richmond Police Department employee, sued the department and others alleging she was targeted and fired because of her Christian faith and opposition to homosexuality.
Defendants disciplined and ultimately terminated Flanagan after an internal investigation found she discriminated against a lesbian volunteer, made homophobic remarks, and lied during the investigation.
Flanagan claimed violations of the First Amendment (Free Speech and Free Exercise) and that the termination was pretextual religious discrimination.
The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding Flanagan failed to meet her evidentiary burdens.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether (1) her speech was protected and outweighed by employer interests, (2) the department’s nondiscrimination policy substantially burdened her free exercise rights, and (3) Defendants’ stated reasons for firing her were pretextual.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Flanagan’s religious speech at work is protected public concern under Pickering	Flanagan argued her statements about homosexuality touched on public concern and were protected as a private citizen.	Employer argued speech disrupted workplace and undermined nondiscrimination policy, so employer interest outweighs employee interest.	Court: Employer interest in a discrimination‑ and harassment‑free workplace outweighed Flanagan’s First Amendment interest; speech not protected in this context.
Whether application of the department’s nondiscrimination policy violated Free Exercise	Flanagan argued policy application substantially burdened her religious exercise.	Employer argued policy was neutral and generally applicable and did not substantially burden her practice.	Court: No triable issue that policy substantially burdened her free exercise; claim fails.
Whether Defendants’ stated reasons for firing Flanagan were pretext for religious discrimination	Flanagan argued the investigation and rationale were pretextual and motivated by her religious beliefs.	Employer produced reasons: discrimination against volunteer, homophobic remarks, and lying during investigation.	Court: Flanagan failed to produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext or that employer lacked honest belief; summary judgment affirmed.
Evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment	Flanagan relied on her affidavit denying the investigation’s findings.	Employer pointed to investigation report and lack of contradictory evidence.	Court: Affidavit denial alone insufficient; plaintiff needed specific and substantial facts to create triable issue.

Key Cases Cited

Tucker v. State of Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996) (speech touching matters of public concern analysis)
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1968) (balancing public employee speech against employer interests)
Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1997) (limits on employee religious speech at work)
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (U.S. 1994) (employer interest in minimizing workplace disruptions)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (public concern and disruption inquiry)
Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2013) (substantial burden free exercise standard)
Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (standards for proving pretext)
Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment proof required in circumstantial cases)
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1998) (specific and substantial facts needed to avoid summary judgment)
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff must show employer did not honestly believe its reasons)