Los Indios v. Day
1 CA-CV 16-0222
| Ariz. Ct. App. | Mar 30, 2017Background
- Riggs (later successor Los Indios, LLC) owned an apartment complex and had issued stock certificates granting residents exclusive occupancy of units. Day occupied a unit under a 1990 License Agreement with an option to purchase.
- Riggs sued Day to quiet title, alleging the 1990 License Agreement did not create a real property interest. Riggs served Day with the amended complaint on August 28, 2015.
- Day filed two pro se letters with the court in September 2015 (one titled “Civil Answer”), responding to the allegations, denying that the agreement clouded title, and offering to sign a quitclaim deed; she did not serve those letters on Riggs.
- Unaware of Day’s filings, Riggs applied for entry of default and obtained a final default judgment after Day did not appear at the default-judgment hearing on October 28, 2015.
- Day moved to set aside the default judgment; the trial court found her September filing constituted an answer and set aside the judgment (citing Rule 60), and Riggs (now Indios) appealed.
- The court of appeals affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the default judgment was void because Day’s answer was filed before default became effective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Day’s pro se letters satisfied Rule 8(b) as an answer | Letters did not materially respond to allegations; insufficient | Letters admitted/denied key allegations and asserted defenses; met Rule 8(b) | Held: letters met Rule 8(b); substantive pleading detail not required |
| Whether failure to serve the answer on plaintiff justified default judgment | Failure to serve prevented plaintiff from being notified; entitles default | Filing was timely; failure to serve alone does not automatically justify default; no bad faith | Held: failure to serve, without bad faith or prejudice, did not require default judgment |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in setting aside default judgment | Default-vacatur standards (Rule 60(c)(6)) not satisfied (lack of promptness, meritorious defense) | Default was void because answer was filed before default became effective; setting aside required | Held: No abuse; court should have (and effectively did) treat judgment as void under Rule 60(c)(4) |
| Whether appellant is entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal | Appellant sought fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 | Respondent sought fees but cited no authority | Held: Denied Indios’ fee request (not prevailing party); denied Day’s fee request but awarded costs on compliance with rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230 (discusses abuse of discretion standard for setting aside default judgments)
- Richas v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 512 (states preference for resolution on merits when vacating defaults)
- Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 123 Ariz. 589 (explains Rule 8(b) does not require extensive fact pleading)
- Dons Club v. Anderson, 83 Ariz. 94 (an answer containing allegations diametrically opposed to complaint satisfies Rule 8(b))
- Haroutunian v. Valueoptions, Inc., 218 Ariz. 541 (counsel’s duty to monitor case status)
- Almarez v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 189 (preference to resolve disputes on merits affects vacatur analysis)
- Corbet v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 245 (default judgment is void if a timely answer was filed before default became effective)
- Martin v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 11 (trial court must set aside void judgments)
- Jepson v. New, 164 Ariz. 265 (standards for relief under Rule 60(c)(6))
- Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, 240 Ariz. 420 (jurisdictional citation used)