157 A.3d 223
Me.2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Scamman et al.) were full-time Shaw’s employees terminated in a 2012 reduction in force; the employer’s policy of terminating only full-time employees disproportionately affected older workers.
- Plaintiffs filed MHRA complaints alleging disparate impact age discrimination; the Maine Human Rights Commission investigator applied the three-step "business necessity" burden-shifting framework and the Commission adopted that analysis.
- Shaw’s removed the Superior Court action to federal court; the federal court certified the question whether MHRA disparate-impact age claims are evaluated under the ADEA’s RFOA defense, the business necessity test, or another standard.
- The key legal question: does the ADEA’s affirmative defense (reasonable factor other than age, RFOA) apply to MHRA disparate-impact age claims, or does Maine apply the business necessity framework used in Title VII/earlier MHRA decisions?
- The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found the MHRA ambiguous on this point, reviewed legislative history and agency interpretation, and considered state precedent applying business necessity to MHRA disparate-impact claims (e.g., City of Auburn).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which standard governs disparate-impact age claims under the MHRA? | MHRA disparate-impact claims should be evaluated under the business necessity burden-shifting framework (as applied by the Commission). | The ADEA’s RFOA affirmative defense should govern MHRA claims, which would entitle Shaw’s to judgment as a matter of law. | The business necessity framework governs MHRA disparate-impact age claims; the ADEA RFOA defense does not apply under Maine law. |
| Is deference owed to the Maine Human Rights Commission’s interpretation? | The Commission’s longstanding application of business necessity is reasonable and entitled to deference. | Shaw’s argued the Commission’s interpretation was indeterminate and that federal ADEA law should control. | The Court afforded deference to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation, supported by statutory text, history, and precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (holding ADEA disparate-impact scope narrower than Title VII because of RFOA defense)
- Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (discussing burden allocation under ADEA and RFOA)
- Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (describing Title VII disparate-impact business necessity framework)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (establishing disparate-impact theory and business necessity requirement)
- Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253 (applying business necessity framework to MHRA disparate-impact claims)