Lorraine Carrethers v. John McHugh
698 F. App'x 266
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Lorraine Carrethers, a Black civilian IT specialist for the Army, alleged racial and sexual harassment by supervisors and experienced panic attacks and PTSD.
- She filed informal and formal complaints (EEO/EEOC) alleging race-based hostile work environment and specific sexual-harassment incidents by supervisor Theresa McGuire.
- An Army Regulation 15-6 investigation concluded Carrethers’ allegations were unsubstantiated and suggested she was abusing the system; the Army proposed removal and then discharged her in April 2014.
- Carrethers appealed her removal to the MSPB; an administrative judge held a hearing and affirmed the removal.
- She then brought a mixed-case action in district court asserting: (1) Title VII retaliation for opposing racial/sexual harassment, (2) WPA retaliation for protected disclosures, and (3) that the MSPB decision lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim and held Carrethers estopped from pursuing racial-based retaliation by an EEOC settlement; the Army conceded on appeal the settlement did not bar retaliation claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Carrethers is estopped by the EEOC settlement from asserting racial retaliation | Settlement did not bar her mixed-case retaliation claims | Settlement covers EEOC claim; district court said it estopped racial retaliation | Appellee conceded settlement does not bar retaliation claims; court rejects estoppel basis and proceeds to merits of pleadings |
| Whether the complaint plausibly pleaded Title VII and WPA retaliation (sufficiency of allegations) | Alleged specific harassment incidents, formal EEOC complaint, reprimand, and Army’s statement that removal was for unsubstantiated allegations — enough to infer protected activity, agency awareness, adverse action, and causation | Argued pleadings lacked detail (how/where complaints made) and thus failed to state a claim | Complaint sufficiently pleaded plausible retaliation claims under Title VII and WPA to survive 12(b)(6); merits not decided |
| Whether the complaint plausibly challenged the MSPB decision as lacking substantial evidence/arbitrary and capricious | Count 3 incorporated prior factual allegations and claimed MSPB decision lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary/capricious | Argued Count 3 contained only legal conclusions and insufficient facts | Construing facts in plaintiff’s favor, Count 3 plausibly alleged the MSPB decision could be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must be plausible to survive dismissal)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (court need not accept legal conclusions; plausibility standard explained)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (Title VII complaints need not plead facts establishing prima facie case at pleading stage)
- Keys v. Humana, 684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012) (retaliation pleading standard and Title VII context)
- Drake v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 543 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (elements for WPA retaliation claim)
