Lorna Dorrell v. Carolyn Colvin
670 F. App'x 480
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Lorna Dorrell appealed the district court’s grant of the Social Security Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking disability insurance benefits under Title II.
- Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Dorrell’s depression non-severe because it was treatable and responsive to medication.
- ALJ discounted Dorrell’s subjective reports about severe migraine headaches, citing exaggerated symptom descriptions, daily activities inconsistent with claimed limitations, and significant gaps in migraine treatment.
- Two treating physicians had described severe migraines, but their opinions relied largely on Dorrell’s subjective reports.
- The ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and the hypothetical to the vocational expert excluded limitations from depression and migraines; the ALJ relied on the discredited subjective reports to justify rejecting those medical opinions.
- The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed the district court; a dissent argued the ALJ erred by failing to adequately explain rejection of the treating physicians’ opinions and that the error was not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether depression was a medically severe impairment | Depression sufficiently severe to affect work | Depression was treated effectively and responsive to medication, thus non-severe | Depression found non-severe; ALJ’s finding supported by substantial evidence |
| Credibility of migraine symptom testimony | Dorrell’s migraine reports described severe, work-preclusive headaches | ALJ: reports exaggerated; inconsistent with daily activities and gaps in treatment | ALJ provided specific, clear, convincing reasons to discredit migraine testimony |
| Weight to treating physicians’ opinions about migraines | Treating physicians documented severe migraines and functional limits based on clinical findings | Medical opinions were based on Dorrell’s subjective (discredited) reports, so ALJ could discount them | Majority: ALJ permissibly rejected those medical opinions; any error harmless |
| Harmless-error review for improperly rejected evidence | Rejection of treating opinions could change disability outcome; error not harmless | Even crediting testimony, no reasonable ALJ would reach different result (harmless) | Majority: error (if any) was harmless; Dissent: error was not harmless and required explanation |
Key Cases Cited
- Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007) (factors ALJ may consider when evaluating claimant credibility)
- Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding ALJ where evidence permits more than one rational interpretation)
- Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ’s hypothetical must be based on medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence)
- Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (standards for rejecting an examining physician’s uncontradicted opinion)
- Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (harmless error standard in Social Security cases)