Lori Marino v. NOAA, 33 F.4th 593

Plaintiffs (animal-welfare organizations and individuals) sued NMFS and NOAA seeking enforcement of pre-1994 SeaWorld permits that required facilities to transmit medical and necropsy data after an orca's death.
Pre-1994 permits commonly required submission of necropsy/medical history reports; those reports had previously been disclosed via FOIA.
NMFS in 2017 announced it would not enforce necropsy-related permit provisions, interpreting 1994 MMPA amendments as shifting post-capture oversight to USDA-APHIS; plaintiffs dispute that statutory interpretation.
The deaths of Tilikum (January 2017) and two other SeaWorld orcas prompted the plaintiffs to press NMFS to enforce the permit conditions; NMFS declined and reiterated its position.
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; the district court dismissed for lack of standing. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding plaintiffs failed to show their injury was redressable.
The court rested its standing ruling on two independent defects: (1) plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a favorable ruling would make NMFS enforce the permit conditions (prosecutorial discretion), and (2) plaintiffs did not plausibly allege SeaWorld would (or could) provide the reports even if ordered (records retention rules and voluntary noncompliance).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing — redressability generally	Court order vacating NMFS non-enforcement would cause NMFS to obtain reports and remedy plaintiffs' informational injury	Plaintiffs cannot show a favorable ruling would likely cause NMFS to enforce permits or compel disclosure	No standing: plaintiffs failed to show redressability
First-party redressability (NMFS enforcement)	NMFS must enforce pre-1994 permit terms and would do so if court ruled its interpretation unlawful	NMFS has prosecutorial discretion and the MMPA uses permissive language allowing non-enforcement	Held for NMFS: plaintiffs did not plausibly allege NMFS likely to enforce even if court ruled for them
Third-party redressability (SeaWorld compliance)	Regulated entities are presumed to comply; SeaWorld would turn over necropsy records if NMFS required it	SeaWorld’s independent choice (and regulatory retention limits) could prevent redress; plaintiffs pleaded no facts showing SeaWorld would comply	Held for NMFS: plaintiffs failed to allege SeaWorld would or could provide reports (records retention undermines presumed compliance)
Merits—statutory authority to enforce pre-1994 permits	1994 amendments did not eliminate NMFS’s authority to enforce permit conditions	1994 amendments shifted post-capture welfare oversight to APHIS, depriving NMFS of enforcement authority	Court did not reach merits; dismissed for lack of standing

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing elements and injury-in-fact requirement)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (redressability requirement for standing)
Competitive Enterprise Inst. v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (remand may lead to favorable agency exercise of discretion when plausible)
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (special solicitude for states in standing analysis)
Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (standing framework application)
Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (pleading standards for standing at dismissal stage)
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (difficulty of redressability when relief depends on independent third-party choices)
Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (context for presumption of third-party compliance; not controlling here)
Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. DOD, 785 F.3d 719 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (no standing when redress depends on speculative future event)
Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing public display permits under MMPA)