153 So. 3d 315
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Parties divorced in 2011; final judgment adopted a parenting plan with shared parental responsibility and a timesharing schedule for three minor children.
- Husband moved for contempt, alleging wife (1) discussed litigation with children, (2) made derogatory statements about him, (3) allowed children to refuse visitation, and (4) scheduled events during his timesharing.
- Court appointed a reunification therapist and a court psychologist to investigate; hearings followed as the middle son repeatedly refused visitation; eldest turned 18 during proceedings.
- Trial court found multiple, specific violations of the parenting plan by the wife, held her in contempt, ordered makeup remedies, and imposed sanctions: ordered the middle son to a wilderness program (later moot), required the wife to attend individual therapy (open‑ended standard), and required the wife to pay the psychologist’s full fee, half of the reunification therapist, and husband’s attorney’s fees.
- Wife appealed challenging contempt findings, the therapy order, and the fee awards; the appellate court affirmed contempt and fee awards, reversed the therapy requirement as vague/overbroad, and deemed the wilderness program order moot.
Issues
| Issue | Wife's Argument | Husband's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether contempt finding was supported | Wife: Court failed to identify specific parenting‑plan provisions violated; relied on aspirational language | Husband: Court cited specific instances (missed exchanges, scheduled events, disparagement) showing willful noncompliance | Affirmed — record contained competent, specific violations supporting contempt (not solely aspirational language) |
| Whether contemnor had ability to comply | Wife: Children refused, so she lacked ability to force compliance | Husband: Wife had ability (sometimes brought children), scheduled events on his time, and encouraged children to resist | Affirmed — court found ability to comply and willfulness; evidence supported that finding |
| Whether trial court could order and condition therapy as remediation | Wife: Therapy requirement was vague, conditioned on children’s attitude, potentially insurmountable | Husband: Therapy appropriate to remedy alienation and facilitate co‑parenting | Reversed as to therapy — therapy condition was vague, not a proper purge; statutory authority to order therapy not established by majority (concurring opinions dispute authority) |
| Whether court could award expert and attorney’s fees | Wife: Husband has superior ability to pay; fee award should consider need/ability | Husband: Statute authorizes fees as sanction for refusing time‑sharing; triggered by wrongful conduct, not financial disparity | Affirmed — section 61.13(4) authorizes reasonable costs and fees for enforcing time‑sharing; Robinson‑Wilson controls (need/ability test inapplicable) |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilcoxon v. Moller, 132 So.3d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (standard of review for contempt orders)
- Harris v. Hampton, 70 So.3d 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (ability to comply required for contempt)
- DeMello v. Buckman, 914 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (contempt must be based on what the order actually says)
- Marcus v. Marcus, 902 So.2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (contrast for specificity required in orders)
- Robinson‑Wilson v. Wilson, 932 So.2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (fee awards under section 61.13(4) are tied to wrongful conduct, not parties’ relative resources)
- Lanza v. Lanza, 804 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (orders requiring therapy must be sufficiently precise)
- Perlow v. Berg‑Perlow, 875 So.2d 383 (Fla. 2004) (limits on adopting proposed orders without independent court judgment)