Loretta Capeheart v. Melvin Terrell, 695 F.3d 681

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University who alleges First Amendment retaliation by the university president and provost in official capacities.
She claims defamation, department chair denial, and award denial were motivated by her speech on campus issues, including hiring Latino faculty and hosting recruiters.
Key incidents include: April 2006 protest at a campus job fair leading to police involvement and an internal report suggesting potential administrative action.
September 2006 Capeheart criticized Northeastern at a Latino Caucus; the provost Frank acknowledged differences but favored more Latino hires only with more funds.
February 2007 student arrests at a CIA recruiting event; Capeheart engaged with administrators and faculty, and faced related comments and investigations about a student complaint.
In 2007–2008, Capeheart was denied a Faculty Excellence Award while a colleague with a different profile was overruled; she later received an award in 2008 but no ongoing denial claim is alleged.
In 2008, Hahs proposed a campus demonstration policy; it was circulated, criticized, and withdrawn, with no record of future enforcement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is Capeheart's federal claim ripe for injunctive relief?	Capeheart argues ongoing retaliation risks future harm and seeks prospective relief.	Defendants contend the claim is too conjectural and the threat is not immediate.	Claim unripe; no immediate danger; no injunctive relief advisable.
May the pre-enforcement challenge to Hahs' demonstration policy proceed?	Policy threatens to restrict demonstrations; pre-enforcement challenge is warranted if concrete.	Policy was withdrawn; no current or concrete policy to challenge; speculative harms.	Pre-enforcement challenge too speculative; no live policy to review.
Should the district court's dismissal of state-law claims be affirmed or reversed?	State-law claims should be retained if federal issues are not dispositive.	Court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction given unripeness of federal claim.	District court’s decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction affirmed; state-law claims dismissed without prejudice.

Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Bartland, 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011) (ripeness considerations for pre-enforcement challenges)
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College, 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006) (ripeness and injury requirements for preliminary relief)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (elements of standing and immediacy for injunctive relief)
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) (immediacy and concreteness required for relief)
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (injunctions and prospective relief in regulatory contexts)
Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (ripeness and standing for pre-enforcement challenges)
In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2010) (exceptional circumstances for retaining jurisdiction over state claims)
Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2001) (standards for supplemental jurisdiction and related review)
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (ripeness and pre-enforcement considerations)
Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill, 652 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (limits of supplemental jurisdiction and discretionary dismissal)