Lorenzo Roundtree v. United States, 885 F.3d 1095

In 2007 a jury convicted Lorenzo Roundtree of distributing heroin resulting in death; he was sentenced to mandatory life under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
Roundtree’s direct appeal affirmed; he later filed a § 2255 motion raising ineffective assistance and insufficient-evidence claims; the court remanded for an ineffective-assistance hearing concerning counsel’s failure to advise of a potential mandatory life sentence.
After remand the Supreme Court decided Burrage v. United States, clarifying that § 841(b)(1)(C) applies only if the drug distributed was a but-for cause of death (not merely a contributing factor).
Roundtree sought to expand his § 2255 proceedings to assert a Burrage-based claim that the jury instruction (requiring only that the heroin contributed to death) was erroneous; the district court denied expansion and later denied relief; this Court granted COA only on the Burrage claim.
The trial evidence included medical examiner Dr. Goodin’s uncontradicted testimony that morphine (the metabolite of heroin) could alone have caused the victim’s death and that alcohol levels alone were insufficient to cause death, though alcohol and morphine acted synergistically.
The district court concluded Roundtree’s Burrage claim was procedurally defaulted; on de novo review this Court affirmed, holding no actual prejudice from the pre-Burrage jury instruction given Dr. Goodin’s testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Roundtree may raise a Burrage-based challenge to the jury instruction on collateral review despite procedural default	Roundtree: Burrage requires but-for causation; pre-Burrage instruction (allowing mere contribution) rendered sentence invalid and requires relief	Government: Instructional error was procedurally defaulted and Roundtree cannot show cause and actual prejudice to excuse default	The claim is procedurally barred: no actual prejudice shown because medical testimony established heroin/morphine could alone have caused death, satisfying Burrage
Whether the incorrect instruction "infected the entire trial" under Frady for collateral relief	Roundtree: The erroneous instruction deprived him of due process and enhanced his sentence improperly	Government: Even under total-trial review, the evidence (uncontradicted expert testimony) shows no due-process violation	Held: Instruction error did not rise to Frady-level prejudice; conviction/sentence stand

Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (requires but-for causation for § 841(b)(1)(C) enhancement)
Roundtree v. United States, 751 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (remand for ineffective-assistance hearing)
United States v. Burrage, 687 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012) (prior Eighth Circuit contributing-factor instruction precedent)
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (procedural-default standard for collateral relief requires cause and actual prejudice)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (actual-innocence gateway for collateral review)
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (standards for actual-innocence exception to procedural default)