Lorenzo Davis v. City of Chicago, 889 F.3d 842

Lorenzo Davis was an investigator then supervisor at Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), responsible for interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, and drafting disciplinary reports recommending findings (sustained/not sustained/exonerated/unfounded).
IPRA’s Chief Administrator retained final authority to make disciplinary recommendations and to set procedures; in 2015 Chief Administrator Scott Ando instituted a policy requiring his approval for all "sustained" findings and disciplining refusal to comply.
Davis alleges Ando and his deputy ordered him to change sustained findings to favor officers; Davis refused and alleges Ando threatened termination and requested editable versions of his reports to alter them.
After Davis continued to refuse to revise reports under the new approval policy, Ando fired him in July 2015; Davis sued the City alleging First Amendment retaliation (plus state-law claims dismissed without prejudice).
The district court dismissed Davis’s constitutional claims with prejudice; the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, holding Davis’s refusal to revise reports was not protected speech.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Davis’s refusal to change reports is speech as a private citizen	Davis: refusal was principled speech exposing misconduct; therefore protected	City: refusal was made pursuant to Davis’s official duties as an IPRA investigator/supervisor	Held: speech was made pursuant to official duties (Garcetti) and not protected
Whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern	Davis: investigative findings about police misconduct are matters of public concern	City: management of internal reports is part of job duties and not private-speech concern	Court: (concurrence) such reports may be public concern, but that does not change outcome because speech was job-related
Whether refusing to make a statement differs from affirmatively making one for First Amendment analysis	Davis: distinction—refusal to change differs from compelled false statement	City: distinction is meaningless for Garcetti concerns about employer management	Held: refusal is equivalent for purposes of Garcetti; courts should avoid intervening in managerial decisions
Whether good-faith refusal to follow orders (to avoid falsity) creates First Amendment protection	Davis: refusing to draft misleading reports should be protected	City: a good-faith reason to disobey does not convert job-related speech into citizen speech	Held: motive or good reason does not convert speech made pursuant to duties into protected speech

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (speech made pursuant to official duties is not protected under the First Amendment)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (public-employee speech balancing test and limits on constitutionalizing employment decisions)
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (Seventh Circuit standard of review: de novo)
Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818 (elements for public-employee First Amendment claim)
Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (Seventh Circuit discussion of balancing interests)
Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (job duties include employer's real rules and expectations)
Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45 (employee’s good reasons for refusal do not automatically create a First Amendment claim)
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (distinguishing refusal to falsify reports that would amount to criminal conduct)
Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939 (pre-Garcetti: protection where investigator ordered to conceal police corruption)