Lorenc v. Forest Preserve District
59 N.E.3d 899
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 5, 2013 the Forest Preserve District of Will County ran a public bicycle event (“Cruise the Creek”); James F. Lorenc participated and later died after a fall.
- Volunteer "trail sentinels" were placed to notify riders of trail features (e.g., an upcoming bridge); sentinels were instructed to stand off the trail.
- A sentinel allegedly stepped into the middle of the trail and waved, causing riders to brake/swerve; Lorenc fell and sustained fatal injuries.
- Plaintiff (Kathleen Lorenc, special administrator) sued for wrongful death and survival claims alleging willful and wanton misconduct by the District/its volunteer sentinel.
- Defendant moved to dismiss under Ill. Code Civ. P. §2-615 (failure to state willful and wanton claim) and §2-619 (immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, §§2-109 and 2-201).
- The trial court granted dismissal on both grounds; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint plausibly alleged willful and wanton conduct by the District/volunteer | Lorenc: sentinel’s stepping into trail, contrary to instructions, showed utter indifference/conscious disregard sufficient to plead willful and wanton conduct | District: the sentinel’s act was at most negligent/inadvertent; the District took safety measures and the single act does not meet statutory willful and wanton standard | The facts alleged do not rise to willful and wanton conduct; dismissal under §2‑615 affirmed |
| Whether the Act bars liability (immunity under §§2‑109, 2‑201) | Lorenc: sentinel’s act was not discretionary or policy-driven, so §2‑201 immunity does not apply | District: placement/use of volunteer sentinels and their execution involved discretion; §2‑201 (and §2‑109) shield the public entity | Appellate court held sentinels exercised discretion and §2‑201 immunity applied; §2‑619 dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the court’s dismissal should be reviewed as §2‑615 or §2‑619 | Lorenc: trial court’s language suggested a §2‑615 basis only and plaintiff challenged that sufficiency ruling | District: both motions were filed and court addressed both grounds; appellate review should consider both bases de novo | Court reviewed both grounds de novo and resolved both in favor of the District |
Key Cases Cited
- Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76 (2004) (standard for ruling on a section 2-615 motion)
- Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215 (2010) (willful and wanton conduct characterized as aggravated negligence)
- Kirwan v. Lincolnshire-Riverwoods Fire Protection District, 349 Ill. App. 3d 150 (2004) (elements required to plead willful and wanton conduct)
- Floyd v. Rockford Park District, 355 Ill. App. 3d 695 (2005) (violation of internal rules alone does not prove willful and wanton conduct)