981 F.3d 288
4th Cir.2020Background
- Varner was approached by Augusta County Deputy Michael Roane while eating at a restaurant; Roane asked him to get his jacket and go outside, patted him down, found nothing, and asked him to submit to a breath test which Varner refused.
- K‑9 officer Jeremy Johnson and his dog Zeke then examined Varner’s parked car; Johnson reported a positive alert. Varner alleges Johnson slapped the car to trigger Zeke, who then jumped up and alerted; Johnson testified Zeke alerted by pressing his nose to the car with all paws on the ground on the far side of the vehicle.
- Police searched the car after the alert and found no drugs.
- Varner sued Deputy Roane under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting (1) an unlawful seizure of his person during the pat‑down and (2) an unlawful search of his vehicle based on a manufactured K‑9 alert.
- The district court dismissed the seizure claim at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage (finding the encounter plausibly consensual) and granted summary judgment for Roane on the K‑9/search claim (finding no genuine dispute that the dog legitimately alerted and thus probable cause existed).
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed: it held Varner’s complaint failed to plead facts showing a non‑consensual seizure, and summary judgment was proper because Varner offered only speculative, non‑observational assertions that failed to rebut the officers’ testimony about the dog’s certified, trained alert.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Varner was seized (non‑consensual encounter) when Roane asked him to leave the restaurant and patted him down | Varner contends Roane “commanded” him to exit and thus the encounter was not consensual | Roane contends the encounter was consensual: no show of force, no threats, no blocking, and no accusatory language | Court: Dismissal affirmed — complaint lacked factual detail to overcome objective consent test; encounter was plausibly consensual |
| Whether the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment because Johnson allegedly manufactured Zeke’s positive alert | Varner contends Johnson smacked the car to force an alert and Zeke’s behavior was erratic, so alert was fabricated and cannot supply probable cause | Defendants contend Zeke was certified, trained, and legitimately alerted by pressing his nose to the car, giving probable cause | Court: Summary judgment affirmed — Varner offered only speculative, non‑observational assertions and failed to create a genuine dispute about the K‑9 alert or show a conspiracy to manipulate the dog |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (defines seizure and stop‑and‑frisk standards)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent doctrine and limits on coercion)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (consensual encounters vs. seizures analysis)
- Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (objective test for feeling free to leave)
- United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (officer approach and voluntariness of consent)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (factors bearing on whether a person has been seized)
- Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) (certified drug‑detection dogs’ alerts can establish probable cause)
- United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994) (K‑9 may circle vehicle without individualized suspicion)
- United States v. Jones, 678 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2012) (context where officer conduct suggested lack of consent)
- United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991 (4th Cir. 2015) (application of objective test for freedom to leave)
