Loren J. Larson Jr. v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections, Board of Parole, 476 P.3d 293

Loren J. Larson Jr., convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder (sentenced to consecutive 99‑year terms), maintains his innocence and has repeatedly sought post‑conviction relief without success.
Alaska’s clemency process (adopted and revised administratively) has four phases; the first (initial application) is handled by the Board of Parole, which screens applications for completeness and returns incomplete packets rather than forwarding them to the governor.
The Board’s required initial application packet includes two information‑release forms (general and medical); the Board informed Larson that an application submitted without those signed releases would be considered incomplete and returned.
Larson sued the Board in superior court claiming (1) a due process right under Lewis v. State to a fair opportunity at the initial application phase to make a factual showing for clemency without being forced to sign release forms, and (2) that conditioning forwarding an application on signing releases violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The superior court granted summary judgment for the Board; the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s screening practice and initial‑phase release requirement did not violate Larson’s constitutional rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Due process under Lewis	Larson: Lewis requires a fair opportunity at the initial application phase to present facts (e.g., proof of innocence) without signing information releases.	Board: Lewis grants limited process but does not forbid reasonable application screening; Larson was not prevented from gathering/presenting evidence and clemency is discretionary.	Court: Lewis applies but Larson showed no due‑process deprivation; initial release requirement is reasonable and not arbitrary, so no violation.
Unconstitutional conditions (privacy waiver)	Larson: Requiring forfeiture of privacy rights at the initial phase coerces waiver of constitutional rights and is invalid.	Board: Doctrine inapplicable or limited in criminal/post‑conviction contexts; even if applicable, the release requirement is reasonable and related to legitimate investigatory interests.	Court: Assumed doctrine can apply but held the requirement is justified and proportionate for investigatory purposes; claim fails.
Delegation / Screening power	Larson: Board’s refusal to forward an incomplete application effectively denies access to governor.	Board: Legislature and governor may delegate screening to Board; returning incomplete applications is proper administrative screening.	Court: Board properly delegated to screen incomplete applications; returning incomplete packets is lawful.

Lewis v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 139 P.3d 1266 (Alaska 2006) (recognizing limited procedural due process protections for clemency applicants and applying Mathews balancing)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (due process balancing test for administrative procedures)
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1998) (addressing Fifth Amendment and procedural protections in clemency/review interviews)
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (U.S. 2013) (discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine)
Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2000) (reasonableness test applied to conditions on prison visitation)
Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974) (commutation condition challenged under unconstitutional conditions/First Amendment analysis)