Lora Wheatley v. Factory Card and Party Outlet
826 F.3d 412
7th Cir.2016Background
- Wheatley was a store manager at Factory Card from 1996 until termination on July 11, 2009, after extended medical leave for a foot injury.
- Factory Card granted FMLA leave and then four additional weeks, conditioning continued employment on returning by July 11 or being terminated (but eligible for rehire if recovered).
- Wheatley sought treatment from Drs. Bogan, Senica, and Fleischli; Senica cleared her to return July 6 with no restrictions, Fleischli’s Aetna form (July 8) said she had “no ability to work” and needed immobilization until August 15.
- Wheatley claimed a conversation with Fleischli (which she did not present at trial) that a walking boot would allow her to return by July 11; she withdrew Fleischli as a witness and relied on her own affidavit about using a boot at home.
- Factory Card asked for a Fitness-for-Duty form and said ladder-climbing was required; Cole told Wheatley a boot would not be acceptable because of ladder duties.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Factory Card, finding Wheatley failed to produce sufficient evidence (including medical/expert proof) that she was a "qualified individual" who could perform essential functions with a reasonable accommodation; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wheatley was a "qualified individual" under the ADA (could perform essential functions with reasonable accommodation) | Wheatley: she could perform duties if permitted to wear a medical boot and delegate ladder tasks; her own testimony and experience with the boot suffice to create a fact issue | Factory Card: Wheatley produced no medical/expert evidence that the boot would make her capable of performing job duties; record contains physician statements that she was not able to work | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for employer — plaintiff’s self‑reports were conclusory and insufficient; need non‑speculative evidence that accommodation would enable performance |
| Whether the district court erred procedurally in allowing renewed summary judgment (scheduling order/good cause) | Wheatley: initial summary-judgment filing was after dispositive-motion deadline; court abused discretion allowing it | Factory Card: renewed motion was timely and premised on Wheatley’s withdrawal of Fleischli as a witness; good cause shown | Court: Procedural ruling not abused; even if initial motion timing challenged, renewed motion stands on independent grounds and merits were dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2015) (evaluator’s speculative adjustments insufficient to show plaintiff could perform essential functions)
- Basden v. Professional Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2013) (insufficient evidence where plaintiff lacked diagnosis, prescribed treatment, or date she could regularly attend work)
- Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001) (framework for assessing whether individual can perform essential functions with or without accommodation)
- Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (conclusory psychiatric opinion inadequate to show accommodation would enable job performance)
- EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2010) (medical testimony not always required to show disability—depends on case specifics)
- Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264 (7th Cir. 1994) (summary-judgment evidence admissible in content if substitution of live testimony would make it admissible at trial)
- Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2014) (business‑records foundation can support admissibility of medical certifications)