343 Conn. 31
Conn.2022Background
- Owner Anthony and Eve Vaccaro listed a Danbury rental with broker William Raveis via salesperson Sarah Henry (independent contractor) under an exclusive right-to-lease contract.
- Plaintiff Carmen Lopez submitted an offer (through agent Sarah Becker) for an April 1, 2017 tenancy; Henry initially told Becker the deal was "all set."
- After Becker sent Section 8 paperwork, Henry repeatedly texted/emailed that she had not known about Section 8, that she had to consult Vaccaro, and that Vaccaro might not want to wait for Section 8 approval; later that day Henry informed Becker Vaccaro accepted a competing offer.
- Lopez sued under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64c(a)(1) (refusal to rent) and (a)(3) (statements indicating preference/discrimination based on lawful source of income).
- Trial court ruled for defendants, finding Henry’s statements would not convey a discriminatory preference to an ordinary listener.
- Connecticut Supreme Court reversed as to Henry and Raveis (liability under §46a-64c(a)(3)); held Raveis vicariously liable under Conn. Gen. Stat. §20-312a; Vaccaros not vicariously liable (Henry was their independent contractor).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard for §46a-64c(a)(3) statements — whether subjective intent/context matters | Lopez: Facially discriminatory statements are judged only by whether an ordinary listener would infer a prohibited preference; if facial, speaker intent irrelevant. | Defendants: Ordinary listener always views statements in context; Soules permits context inquiry. | Court: Adopted Second Circuit approach — if statement is facially discriminatory, no context/intent inquiry; if not facial, context and intent may be considered. |
| Whether Henry’s communications violated §46a-64c(a)(3) (statements indicating preference based on lawful source of income) | Lopez: Henry’s repeated statements that Vaccaro might not want to wait for Section 8 plainly signaled a preference against Section 8 tenants and violated (a)(3). | Henry/Raveis/Vaccaros: Statements were not facially discriminatory and, in context, did not convey impermissible preference. | Court: Clear error to find no violation; context and chronology showed ordinary listener would view Henry’s statements as indicating an intent to make a preference based on lawful source of income — judgment for plaintiff on liability against Henry. |
| Vicarious liability of broker Raveis for Henry’s statements | Lopez: §20-312a makes broker liable for independent-contractor salesperson’s acts as if employee. | Raveis: Argument not disputed below; generally liability depends on facts of agency/scope. | Court: As a matter of law Raveis is vicariously liable under §20-312a because Henry acted on its behalf in the listing and her statements were in furtherance of that contract. |
| Vicarious liability of owners Vaccaro and Eve Vaccaro for Henry’s statements | Lopez: Owners authorized listing and thus are principals; nondelegable duty not to discriminate makes them vicariously liable. | Vaccaros: Henry was their independent contractor; owners lacked control over her methods; no exception applies. | Court: Vaccaros not vicariously liable — Henry was independent contractor as to owners and no nondelegable-duty exception applied under governing precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991) (adopted an ordinary-reader test: an ad that discourages a protected group may violate fair housing law regardless of advertiser's intent)
- Soules v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992) (facially discriminatory statements may be judged on their face; non-facial statements warrant context/intent inquiry)
- Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2015) (speaker's subjective intent is not dispositive; focus is whether ordinary listener would perceive a prohibited preference)
- Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2003) (federal fair housing liability follows ordinary tort vicarious-liability principles)
- Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates, 250 Conn. 763 (Conn. 1999) (Connecticut public policy requires landlords to accept otherwise qualified tenants who use Section 8; lawful source of income is a protected class)