Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1

Marvin Smith was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of his wife; physical evidence (DNA on the murder weapon and duct tape, missing jewelry found in his car) and circumstantial evidence supported guilt.
The prosecution tried theories that Smith either delivered the fatal blow or, alternatively, aided and abetted an accomplice; the jury was instructed on aiding-and-abetting and returned a general verdict of first-degree murder.
Smith argued at trial that recent shoulder surgery made it impossible for him to have delivered the fatal blow and that a former employee might have committed the crime.
State courts (California Court of Appeal) held Smith had adequate notice that he could be convicted as an aider and abettor, pointing to the charging information, preliminary-examination testimony, and the prosecutor’s late request for an aiding-and-abetting instruction.
Smith sought federal habeas relief; the district court and Ninth Circuit granted relief, concluding Smith’s Sixth Amendment/due-process notice rights were violated because the prosecution focused at trial on the theory that Smith himself delivered the fatal blow.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding the Ninth Circuit improperly relied on its own precedent and that the Ninth Circuit had no Supreme Court decision to cite showing the notice standard Smith needed.

Issue	Smith's Argument	Lopez (State/Warden)'s Argument	Held
Whether a prosecutor’s trial focus on one theory can, despite prior adequate notice, violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment/due-process right to notice so as to warrant habeas relief	Prosecutor’s focus on the principal-delivery theory deprived Smith of meaningful notice of conviction as an aider/abetter, violating notice rights	Prior notice via charging information, preliminary-exam testimony, and the aiding-and-abetting instruction request was adequate; Ninth Circuit relied on its own precedent rather than Supreme Court law	Reversed: Supreme Court found no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that a prosecutorial focus can nullify earlier adequate notice; Ninth Circuit improperly relied on its own case law
Whether the Ninth Circuit could overturn the state court’s factual determination that Smith had notice under §2254(d)(2)	Ninth Circuit argued state court unreasonably found preliminary-exam testimony and instruction request provided notice	State court’s factual finding that Smith received adequate notice was reasonable given the record	Reversed: the Supreme Court held the Ninth Circuit’s disagreement was legal (notice standard) and lacked a Supreme Court benchmark; it could not sustain relief as an unreasonable factual determination under §2254(d)(2)

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (defendant must have adequate notice of charges)
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (procedural due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard)
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (convictions cannot be affirmed under statutes for uncharged offenses)
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (notice issue in capital-sentencing context; distinguishable)
Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. decision relied on by Ninth Circuit concerning late notice of alternate theory)
Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (addressed in Ninth Circuit opinion; cited but Supreme Court did not decide on it here)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (harmless-error standard discussed by lower court; Supreme Court did not decide on its application here)