Lopez v. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11188

Background

Morris (Jamil) Days volunteered then worked for the Maryland/Virginia CAIR chapter (CAIR-VA) as civil‑rights manager starting in 2007; he misrepresented himself as a CAIR attorney and took fees while performing no legal work.
CAIR National oversaw affiliated chapters via an affiliation process, maintained a central case database, and paid the salary of Khalid Iqbal, who served as CAIR National’s director of operations and concurrently as CAIR‑VA’s executive director.
Iqbal supervised Days, provided training (including at CAIR National), and corresponded with CAIR National staff about Days; CAIR‑VA tracked Days’s cases in the national database.
After repeated complaints that Days accepted client funds, Iqbal warned him multiple times and ultimately terminated his relationship in February 2008; CAIR National later took possession of CAIR‑VA case files and reviewed them.
Some victims received settlement payments from CAIR National; CAIR’s corporate designee described those payments as an attempt to “right a wrong” by one of its employees.
Plaintiffs sued CAIR National alleging Days was its agent; the district court granted summary judgment to CAIR National. The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, finding genuine issues of material fact as to actual agency and control.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Lopez)	Defendant's Argument (CAIR)	Held
Whether Days was an actual agent of CAIR National	Days represented himself as a CAIR attorney to clients and relied on CAIR materials; CAIR’s conduct (publications, file handling, settlements) manifested consent	CAIR argued no manifestation of consent by National to Days acting on its behalf; CAIR‑VA was independent	Reversed: factual disputes exist whether CAIR National manifested consent such that Days was its agent
Whether CAIR National had the right to control Days’ methods	Training by CAIR National, supervision by Iqbal (who held National title), centralized case tracking, and National review of files show right to control	CAIR asserted limited operational control by the chapter and that Days was not under National’s control	Reversed: evidence could support that National had the right to control and in fact exercised control
Whether circumstantial evidence (publications, database, settlements) can establish agency	Such publications, centralized database, and settlement payments support inference of agency	CAIR contended these facts do not prove manifestation of consent or control sufficient for agency	Reversed: circumstantial evidence can create genuine issue for jury on agency
Whether summary judgment appropriate	Plaintiffs argued summary judgment inappropriate because material facts are disputed and should go to a jury	CAIR argued no reasonable jury could find agency based on the record	Reversed: summary judgment improper given disputes of material fact regarding agency and control

Key Cases Cited

Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (view evidence in light most favorable to nonmovant)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment and materiality standards)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (record as a whole standard; no genuine issue if no rational trier of fact could find for nonmovant)
Reistroffer v. Person, 439 S.E.2d 376 (Va. 1994) (elements of actual agency under Virginia law)
Wynn’s Extended Care, Inc. v. Bradley, [citation="619 F. App'x 216"] (4th Cir.) (agency and control analysis under Virginia law)
Wells v. Whitaker, 151 S.E.2d 422 (Va. 1966) (right to control refers to methods/details, not just results)
Allen v. Lindstrom, 379 S.E.2d 450 (Va. 1989) (power to control is determining factor for agency)
Perry v. Scruggs, [citation="17 F. App'x 81"] (4th Cir.) (distinguishing actual control from right to control)