Lopez v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners
59 N.E.3d 118
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- On August 18, 2014 the Bartonville chief of police filed charges seeking Lopez’s termination under the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners statute.
- The statute requires a termination hearing to be commenced within 30 days of filing the charges.
- Board counsel proposed hearing dates between Sept 2–5 (within 30 days); Lopez’s counsel said those dates did not allow enough time to prepare.
- Parties later agreed (by email/phone) to October 3, 2014 as the hearing date; Lopez sued on Sept 29, 2014 claiming the Board lost jurisdiction because the hearing was set outside the 30‑day period.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the Board, finding the delay was attributable to Lopez because his counsel requested more time; appellate majority affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Board lost jurisdiction by failing to commence the hearing within 30 days of filing charges | Lopez: the hearing was not commenced within 30 days, so the Board lost jurisdiction | Board: the delay resulted from Lopez’s counsel requesting more time; a delay attributable to plaintiff does not divest the Board of jurisdiction | Court: delay was attributable to Lopez; Board retained jurisdiction and summary judgment for the Board was affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303 (1984) (holds Board loses jurisdiction if hearing not commenced within 30 days unless delay is attributable to plaintiff)
- Riggins v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 107 Ill. App. 3d 126 (1982) (delay attributable to plaintiff excuses Board’s failure to commence within 30 days)
- Finin v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 98 Ill. App. 3d 879 (1981) (same principle)
- Kvidera v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 192 Ill. App. 3d 950 (1989) (identifies plaintiff‑caused discovery requests or continuance requests as examples of delay attributable to plaintiff; Board retains scheduling flexibility thereafter)
- Norek v. Herold, 31 Ill. App. 3d 514 (1975) (plaintiff responsible for initial delay cannot later complain the hearing began after the statutory period)
- Bridges v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 83 Ill. App. 3d 190 (1980) (distinguishable: delay caused by city attorney, not plaintiff, so Board lost jurisdiction)
- Massingale v. Police Board, 140 Ill. App. 3d 378 (1986) (continuance requested by plaintiff can make delay attributable to plaintiff)