Lopez-Esparza v. Holder
770 F.3d 606
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Lopez-Esparza, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. illegally in 1999 and resided here continuously except for several visits to Mexico between 2000–2008.
- In 2010 a traffic stop revealed his immigration status; he conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (10 years continuous presence).
- The statute disqualifies applicants who departed the U.S. for any single period exceeding 90 days or aggregate periods exceeding 180 days; the applicant bears the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden to prove continuous presence.
- At the immigration hearing Lopez-Esparza testified to three trips to Mexico; his dates were imprecise but, under plausible reconstructions, aggregated well under 180 days (estimates: 120–158 days, best guess 137 days).
- The immigration judge denied relief for failure to recall precise dates; the BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial and found the IJ applied the wrong standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lopez-Esparza proved continuous 10‑year presence (did not exceed statutory 90/180-day limits) by a preponderance | Lopez-Esparza: testimony, though imprecise, makes it more likely than not his trips aggregate under 180 days | Government: testimony lacks necessary specificity; uncertainty precludes finding he met statutory limits | Court: IJ applied incorrect standard; uncertainty in dates does not defeat preponderance if the range of plausible dates remains below statutory cutoff; remand to BIA |
| Whether the IJ’s reliance on imperfect recollection is legally permissible | Lopez-Esparza: imperfect memory is expected; preponderance standard tolerates uncertain dates when likely below cutoff | Government: doubt about dates justifies denial; factual finding should be conclusive | Court: treating imperfect recollection as dispositive is legal error because it imposes an impossible requirement inconsistent with preponderance standard |
| Whether the courts have jurisdiction to review denial of cancellation under the 10‑year rule | Lopez-Esparza: judicial review permitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) where any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise | Government: argues limitations on review under §1252(a)(2)(B) | Court: follows precedent allowing review of BIA factual findings where legal error alleged; exercised review and found legal error |
| Standard of review for agency factual findings here | Lopez-Esparza: agency must apply preponderance standard, not a requirement of precise memory | Government: agency factual findings generally conclusive | Court: agency findings are binding unless unreasonable; here IJ applied wrong legal standard, so vacatur and remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Nunez-Moron v. Holder, 702 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 2012) (supports judicial review of BIA denials under the 10‑year continuous-residence rule)
- Garda v. Holder, 732 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizes reviewability of similar cancellations-of-removal determinations)
- Acevedo-Aguilar v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008) (same: courts may review denials under the ten‑year continuous residence provision)