71 N.E.3d 24
Ind. Ct. App.2017Background
- Lonnie L. Burton petitioned (pro se) to expunge two 1992 Class D felony convictions (theft and fraud) under Ind. Code § 35-38-9-3.
- Burton disclosed prior out-of-state convictions from Washington (1992: rape, child molestation, sexual exploitation of a minor; 1994: rape).
- The State moved to dismiss Burton’s expungement petition, arguing § 35-38-9-3(b) bars relief for a “sex or violent offender.”
- The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss without a hearing; Burton appealed.
- Burton conceded he meets the statutory definition of a “sex or violent offender” (per Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5) but argued § 35-38-9-3(b) only lists convictions that themselves cannot be expunged and does not disqualify a person from seeking expungement of other, separate convictions.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed statutory language de novo and affirmed dismissal, holding the plain text disqualifies a “sex or violent offender” from expunging Class D/Level 6 felonies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Burton is eligible to expunge Class D convictions under § 35-38-9-3 despite prior sex/violent convictions | State: Burton is ineligible because § 35-38-9-3(b) excludes a “sex or violent offender” from relief | Burton: The statute only prevents expungement of the listed offenses themselves and does not bar a person with disqualifying convictions from expunging other convictions | Court: Affirmed dismissal — statutory text plainly bars a “sex or violent offender” from expunging Class D/Level 6 felonies |
Key Cases Cited
- Cline v. State, 61 N.E.3d 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (expungement statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed)
- D.A. v. State, 58 N.E.3d 169 (Ind. 2016) (statutory interpretation focuses on giving effect to the legislature’s intent using plain language)
- Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767 (Ind. 2016) (when statutory language is plain, courts apply it as written)
- Key v. State, 48 N.E.3d 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (trial court may summarily deny expungement petitions that are facially defective or conclusively show ineligibility)