Longnecker Property v. United States
105 Fed. Cl. 393
Fed. Cl.2012Background
- 3.46 mile right of way in Thurston County, WA at issue in Longnecker class action; STB issued NITU under Trails Act to convert rail line to recreational trail, prompting Takings claim and alleged reversion of rights.
- Deeds Patton, Ellis, Fleetwood, Rowe, Carpenter, Adams, Chambers, and Frase conveyed only easements to the railroad; language and structure of granting/habendum/reverter clauses indicate easements limited to railroad purposes.
- Ownership history shows TO&GHR and NPR originally acquired land, later merging into Burlington Northern; rail line was constructed and operated by 1890s-1911; rail abandonment and railbanking steps occurred in 2002–2005, with NITU issued in 2004 and trail completions by 2007–2009.
- By November 2004, Railbanking and Bargain Sale Contract acknowledged potential reversion upon abandonment or cessation of interim trail use; STB continued to regulate abandonment and railbanking; in 2012 the court had already dismissed fee-interest claims in related deeds.
- This court applies Washington law to interpret scope of easements, uses the Preseault II framework (three-part inquiry) and Lawson interpretations; cross-motions for partial summary judgment addressed whether these easements, under state law, encompassed railbanking/interim trail use.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does railbanking and interim trail use exceed the easements’ scope | Longnecker plaintiffs (Rowe/others) | U.S. Railbanking within easement scope | No; (this entry will be replaced by the court’s conclusion in the Background) |
| Did the Right of Way Deeds permit recreational trail use under Washington law | Easements limited to railroad use; Lawson/Preseault II support. | Trail use could be within scope via railbanking under Trails Act | Yes, but court ultimately held scope exceeded and favored plaintiffs |
| Whether the NITU trigger constitutes a taking under the Trails Act | NITU outside scope constitutes taking | NITU within scope; railbanking preserves future rail use | NITU exceeds scope; plaintiffs win summary judgment on this issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (Trail use can cause a taking if scope of easement is exceeded)
- Preseault II, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Three-part rails-to-trails takings test; scope and abandonment analysis)
- Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Railbanking not to override scope; reality test for trail use)
- Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Trail use outside original easement constitutes taking)
- Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (NITU triggering taking under Trails Act)
- Lawson v. State, 730 P.2d 1309 (Wash. 1986) (Washington recognizes change in use can constitute abandonment)
- Chevy Chase Land Co. of Montgomery County v. United States, 230 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Railtrail scope depends on state-law deeds interpretation)
- Preseault I, 494 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (Trail use valid; Takings require compensation when scope exceeded)