Long v. United States
83 A.3d 369
D.C.2013Background
- In 1998 Long was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder (while armed) and related offenses and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) after the trial judge found three statutory aggravating factors under D.C. Code § 22-2404.1.
- At sentencing the judge made factual findings (heinous/cruel, victim vulnerable by age, substantial planning) beyond the jury’s verdict; some evidence (a confession) used at sentencing had been suppressed at trial.
- After conviction Long pursued post-conviction relief and appeals; while his direct appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, and Booker, which require jury findings for facts that increase maximum punishment.
- Long informed his direct-appeal counsel of the Apprendi issue in writing and filed a pro se motion asserting Apprendi/Blakely; counsel did not raise Apprendi on direct appeal. Subsequent post-conviction counsel also failed timely to file a motion to recall the mandate.
- Long moved (late) to recall the appellate mandate, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise Apprendi; the D.C. Court of Appeals granted a Rule 26(b) extension for “good cause,” found appellate counsel deficient and prejudicial, vacated Long’s sentences (but not convictions), and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Long) | Defendant's Argument (Gov’t) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court should excuse Long’s untimely motion to recall the mandate under D.C. App. R. 26(b) | Long: persistent, timely attempts (letter to counsel, pro se Rule 35) and counsel’s failures justify equitable extension/good cause | Gov’t: Long and counsel knew of the claim for years; must offer better excuse for delay | Court: Found good cause based on counsel’s ineffectiveness and Long’s diligence; permitted late recall motion |
| Whether appellate counsel’s failure to raise Apprendi on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective | Long: counsel ignored explicit request and failed to present an issue that would likely have vacated LWOP | Gov’t: argued procedural defenses and timing; conceded counsel likely lacked strategic reason to omit issue but emphasized procedural bars | Court: Counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable — deficient performance established |
| Whether Long was prejudiced by counsel’s omission (would outcome differ) under Strickland and plain-error/Apprendi analysis | Long: sentencing judge made aggravating-factor findings that a jury should have made; reasonable probability a jury would not have found all factors | Gov’t: emphasized record evidence supporting the judge’s findings and procedural history | Court: Applying plain-error / Neder–Recuenco framework, court concluded there was a reasonable probability a jury would not have found at least one aggravating factor (especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel) beyond a reasonable doubt — prejudice shown |
| Whether the error warrants relief (fourth plain-error prong: fairness/integrity) | Long: judge-made findings on elements that increase punishment undermines fairness and public confidence | Gov’t: urged finality and procedural limits; later waived request to retry sentencing factors to a jury | Court: Error affects fairness and integrity (Keels precedent); exercised discretion to recall mandate, vacate sentences, and remand for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (holding that any fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (aggravating findings that increase maximum punishment function as elements requiring jury determination)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (limits on judge-found sentencing enhancements under Sixth Amendment)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (requiring remedial changes to federal sentencing after Blakely)
- Keels v. United States, 785 A.2d 672 (D.C. 2001) (applying plain-error review and remanding pre-Apprendi LWOP cases for resentencing)
- Dockery v. United States, 853 A.2d 687 (D.C. 2004) (vacating LWOP where judge, not jury, found aggravating factors)
- Robinson v. United States, 890 A.2d 674 (D.C. 2006) (discussing Apprendi application to LWOP sentencing)
- Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056 (D.C. 1987) (mandate-recall is the proper vehicle for alleging ineffective appellate counsel)
- Griffin v. United States, 598 A.2d 1174 (D.C. 1991) (Strickland standard and precedent on ineffective assistance in appellate context)
- Recuenco v. Washington, 548 U.S. 212 (analyzing harmless-error framework where omission affects sentencing element)
- Dominguez Benitez v. United States, 542 U.S. 74 (standard for showing reasonable probability of different outcome on appeal)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (harmless-error analysis where omitted element may have affected jury verdict)
- Rider v. United States, 687 A.2d 1348 (D.C. 1996) (defining “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor)