Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass'n v. Cashion
517 S.W.3d 212
Tex. App.2017Background
- Homeowners Chris and Lisa Cashion and Long Canyon HOA have a long-running dispute over landscaping in a drainage easement; prior litigation in 2009 resulted in a judgment for the Cashions returning a $10,000 deposit and fees.
- On December 18, 2014 the HOA (through counsel) sent a presuit letter threatening fines, suit, damages, attorney’s fees, and a lien for alleged easement violations.
- The Cashions sued the HOA in February 2015 asserting harassment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief; they alleged the letter was part of a pattern of harassment.
- The HOA moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), arguing the Cashions’ suit targeted the HOA’s exercise of the right to petition and association; the trial court denied the motion and the HOA appealed interlocutorily.
- The Court limited the appealable TCPA challenge to claims factually predicated on the December 18 letter because the HOA’s motion did not preserve challenges to other alleged conduct (e.g., surveillance, trespass, long‑standing harassment).
- The Court concluded the presuit letter was protected petitioning activity under the TCPA (as a communication covered by the petition right), but the Cashions failed to present clear and specific evidence establishing prima facie elements of harassment, IIED, negligence, or entitlement to injunctive relief based on that letter.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the HOA's Dec. 18 presuit letter is an "exercise of the right to petition" under the TCPA | The letter was harassing, false, and part of bad‑faith conduct; not protected petitioning | The letter is a presuit demand required by Property Code and thus petitioning/association activity protected by the TCPA | The letter is TCPA‑protected as an exercise of the right to petition (subsection (E)) but not as a communication "pertaining to a judicial proceeding" (no pending suit) |
| Whether the HOA met its initial TCPA burden to show Cashions’ claims are based on protected activity | The Cashions argue their suit is largely about a pattern of harassment beyond the letter | The HOA limited its motion to claims predicated on the Dec. 18 letter and argued those claims are based on protected petitioning | HOA met its initial burden only as to claims factually predicated on the Dec. 18 letter; claims based on broader conduct were not preserved and remain unaffected |
| Whether Cashions established by clear and specific evidence prima facie causes of action (harassment, IIED, negligence) arising from the letter | Cashions relied on affidavit and correspondence alleging stress, alarm, prior selective enforcement, and a pattern of harassment | HOA argued plaintiffs offered only conclusory assertions and insufficient evidence to meet TCPA prima facie standard | Cashions failed to establish prima facie proof for harassment, IIED, negligence based on the letter; those claims are dismissed as to the letter |
| Whether Cashions showed entitlement to injunctive relief to prevent future HOA harassment/enforcement based on the letter | Cashions claimed ongoing improper threats and enforcement exceeding HOA authority | HOA argued plaintiffs lacked evidence of irreparable harm or lack of adequate legal remedy | Cashions did not present clear and specific evidence of irreparable injury or lack of adequate remedy; injunctive claim predicated on the letter was dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (TCPA dismissal procedure and burden allocation)
- GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (standard for severe emotional distress and sufficiency of evidence)
- Hoffmann‑La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (prima facie evidence standard in tort claims)
- IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2004) (elements for injunctive relief and related standards)
- Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015) (distinguishing claims based on petitioning activity from other harassment allegations under the TCPA)
- Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (U.S. 1993) (sham‑petitioning doctrine referenced for petition‑clause limits)
- Levatino v. Apple Tree Café Touring, Inc., 486 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016) (treatment of presuit demand letters and petition‑clause protection)