Loncarevic and Associates, Inc. v. Stanley Foam Corporation
72 N.E.3d 798
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Stanley Foam (NJ corp.) hired part-time bookkeeper/independent contractor Bob Christie to run an advertising fax campaign in 2006; Christie contracted with B2B to transmit mass faxes.
- Christie edited and approved fax content, ordered transmissions, and Stanley Foam paid B2B by check.
- Plaintiff Loncarevic (an Illinois business) received two unsolicited one-page advertising faxes promoting Stanley Foam sent by B2B.
- Duranne (Stanley Foam owner) testified he gave Christie “complete authority” and broad discretion to run the campaign, but said he expected targeting to remain near the company’s shipping point (tristate: NY/NJ/CT).
- Records show instructions to B2B directing coverage “entire USA starting on the East Coast and working west until the 6,000 [run out]” and 4,361 successful transmittals to 2,000+ numbers; defendant admitted liability for transmissions within the tristate area but disputed liability for out-of-area faxes.
- Circuit court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on the TCPA claim; Stanley Foam appealed, arguing factual disputes about Christie’s authority over out-of-area faxes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stanley Foam is a “sender” under the TCPA for faxes sent by B2B | Christie had actual and apparent authority from Stanley Foam to run the campaign; Stanley Foam approved content and paid for transmissions, so faxes were sent on its behalf | Christie exceeded authority by sending faxes outside the tristate area; Stanley Foam is not liable for out-of-area transmissions | Held: Stanley Foam is a sender; no genuine factual dispute—faxes (including those sent to Illinois) were sent on behalf of Stanley Foam |
| Whether agency principles (actual/apparent authority) apply to TCPA “on behalf of” inquiry | Agency rules govern and establish liability where principal authorized agent to run campaign and third party reasonably relied on agent | Agency principles do not establish liability here because authorization was limited to tristate area | Held: Agency principles apply; Duranne’s grant of broad authority and payment/approval estopped Stanley Foam from denying Christie’s authority |
| Whether the record presents triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment | Plaintiff argued undisputed documentary and testimonial evidence showed approval, payment, and instructions for nationwide roll-out | Defendant argued deposition testimony raised genuine disputes about scope of Christie’s authority and internal miscommunication | Held: Summary judgment appropriate—record shows no material factual dispute supporting defendant’s contrary position |
| Whether recognizing liability would create impermissible “sabotage liability” | N/A (plaintiff relied on the established record of approval/payment) | Allowing liability would expose principals to rogue-agent scams | Held: Court rejected sabotage concern as unfounded on these facts given approval, control, and payment by Stanley Foam |
Key Cases Cited
- Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 238 Ill. 2d 332 (procedural standard for summary judgment)
- Palm Beach Golf Center—Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, 781 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir.) (an advertiser can be directly liable as the TCPA “sender” where faxes promoted its goods or services)
- Bridgeview Health Care Center, Ltd. v. Clark, 816 F.3d 935 (7th Cir.) (agency principles govern “on behalf of” inquiry in TCPA junk-fax cases)
- Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay, 2013 IL 114617 (describing TCPA’s purpose and remedies)