640 B.R. 545
Bankr. E.D. Pa.2022Background:
- On Sept. 10, 1998, Michael Picard brutally attacked Sabrina Lombardi (and a roommate), causing serious, long‑term physical and psychological injuries.
- Picard was taken to the ER that night, diagnosed with acute psychosis by Dr. Beverly Mikuriya, and later diagnosed with bipolar disorder; he told staff God told him to act and thought victims had the devil in them.
- Picard pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in the criminal case; Lombardi obtained a $250,000 civil judgment for pain and suffering in 2011.
- Picard filed Chapter 7 in 2016; Lombardi filed an adversary complaint seeking a § 523(a)(6) determination that the civil judgment is nondischargeable as a willful and malicious injury.
- Pretrial delays by Lombardi’s counsel led the court to limit her witnesses and exhibits but proceed to a Zoom trial where Dr. Mikuriya and two eyewitnesses testified about Picard’s psychosis and lack of control.
- The court concluded the assault was malicious but, because Picard was in an acute psychotic break and lacked the requisite intent, the injury was not "willful" under § 523(a)(6); the civil judgment is dischargeable.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the civil judgment is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) (willful & malicious injury) | Lombardi: judgment (and guilty plea) establish willful and malicious injury; debt should be nondischargeable | Picard: he suffered acute psychosis and lacked intent; plea may rest on reckless standard and does not mandate nondischargeability | Injury was malicious but not willful; judgment is dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) |
| Whether the guilty plea/civil judgment has preclusive effect to establish willfulness | Lombardi: plea and civil judgment collaterally estop Picard from denying willfulness | Picard: aggravated assault can be based on recklessness; plea record and civil judgment here do not show intentional conduct | Court declined to treat plea/judgment as dispositive of willfulness given lack of findings that conduct was intentional |
| Whether dismissal for failure to prosecute was warranted after plaintiff counsel missed pretrial deadlines | Lombardi: excusable delay; case should proceed | Picard: sought dismissal due to prejudice from discovery/pretrial noncompliance | Court refused dismissal but imposed sanctions: limited witness list and exhibit admission, and proceeded to trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (§ 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury; reckless conduct not included)
- Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (creditor bears burden of proving nondischargeability by preponderance)
- In re Jacobs, 381 B.R. 128 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (exceptions to discharge construed narrowly; malice requires aggravated circumstances)
- GMAC Inc. v. Coley (In re Coley), 433 B.R. 476 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (willfulness requires subjective awareness of substantially certain harm)
- CB Research & Dev., Inc. v. Kates (In re Kates), 485 B.R. 86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (actions substantially certain to produce injury are willful)
