Lois Young v. Joseph Lagasse, 143 A.3d 131

In June 2013, 82-year-old Lois Young executed a deed gifting her home to her former foster child, Joseph Lagasse, and his wife; the deed was finalized after two meetings with attorney Steven Juskewitch, including one hour-plus meeting with Young alone.
Juskewitch had previously represented Lagasse in earlier criminal matters; Lagasse and his wife accompanied Young to the attorney’s office for part of the process and signed the transfer tax declaration there.
Young continued paying the mortgage and taxes after the transfer; later she suffered a medical incident (fall/stroke) and developed memory problems and reduced independence.
Young sued under the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, arguing the transfer was presumptively the result of undue influence because she was an elderly dependent person who transferred property to someone in a confidential relationship without independent counsel.
The trial court found Juskewitch was independent counsel for Young, credited his testimony about Young’s competence and the meetings, and entered judgment for the Lagasses; Young appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether attorney was “independent counsel” under 33 M.R.S. §1022(1)	"Retained" requires payment by the elderly person; Juskewitch was not independent due to prior representation of Lagasse	Juskewitch met with Young twice, advised her outside others’ presence, and represented only Young’s interests in the transfer	Court held Juskewitch was independent counsel; presumption did not apply
Whether the transfer was presumptively voidable as result of undue influence	Transfer presumed voidable because to person in confidential relationship without independent counsel	Because Young had independent counsel and evidence showed she understood the transfer, presumption is rebutted and no undue influence established	Court held transfer was not voidable under the Act
Whether evidence (totality) compels finding of undue influence notwithstanding counsel’s representation	Post-transfer conduct by Lagasses shows controlling behavior and exploitation, so transfer was product of undue influence	Most alleged misconduct occurred after transfer; contemporaneous evidence showed Young’s awareness and legal advice	Court found record did not compel finding of undue influence; judgment affirmed
Whether common-law undue influence claim should be considered on appeal	Young raised common-law undue influence in appellate brief	Lagasses noted claim was not pleaded or argued below	Court declined to consider common-law claim as unpreserved

Hero v. Macomber, 130 A.3d 398 (deference to trial court factual findings)
Gordon v. Cheskin, 82 A.3d 1221 (standard of review for factual findings)
McCollor v. McCollor, 87 A.3d 761 (analysis of when independent counsel is absent)
Efstathiou v. Efstathiou, 982 A.2d 339 (appellant with burden must show evidence compels contrary finding)
Finucan v. Williams, 73 A.3d 1056 (assumption that trial court made necessary findings when not requested)
Stromberg- Carlson Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 765 A.2d 566 (statutory construction and plain meaning)