Lockhart v. United States
136 S. Ct. 958
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Lockhart pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §2252(a)(4); his PSR said a prior New York first-degree sexual abuse conviction triggered §2252(b)(2)’s 10‑year mandatory minimum.
- The prior state conviction involved an adult (his 53‑year‑old girlfriend), not a minor or ward.
- §2252(b)(2) enhances penalties if the defendant has a prior conviction "under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." The statutory question was whether the phrase "involving a minor or ward" modifies only the final listed offense or all three.
- District Court applied the mandatory minimum; the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split (Eighth Circuit had ruled otherwise).
- The Supreme Court (majority) applied the rule of the last antecedent and statutory context (noting parallels to headings in federal Chapter 109A) and held the modifier applies only to the last item, so Lockhart’s adult‑victim conviction qualified as a predicate.
- Justice Kagan dissented, arguing ordinary usage and legislative history show the modifier applies to all three predicates and invoking the rule of lenity if ambiguity remained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lockhart) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the phrase "involving a minor or ward" modifies all three listed state predicates or only the last one | The modifier applies to all three terms, so Lockhart’s prior sexual abuse of an adult does not trigger §2252(b)(2) | The modifier modifies only the immediately preceding phrase ("abusive sexual conduct"), so prior adult sexual‑abuse convictions qualify | The modifier modifies only the last antecedent; Lockhart’s adult‑victim prior conviction is a §2252(b)(2) predicate |
| Whether canons or context rebut the rule of the last antecedent here | Series‑qualifier canon and common usage favor applying the modifier to the whole list; legislative history supports child‑only reading | Textual reading plus context (parallel to Chapter 109A headings) supports last‑antecedent application; series‑qualifier would create redundancy/superfluity | The rule of the last antecedent applies and is supported by contextual indicia (Chapter 109A parallel); series‑qualifier and legislative history do not overcome it |
| Whether legislative history supports limiting the predicates to offenses involving minors | Senate Report and DOJ commentary indicate predicates target child‑abuse laws, so modifier should apply to all three | Legislative history is ambiguous/incomplete and does not clearly show Congress intended a different treatment of state vs. federal predicates | Legislative history is not clear enough to overcome textual/contextual reading; it does not change the outcome |
| Whether the rule of lenity requires resolving any ambiguity in Lockhart’s favor | If ambiguity exists, lenity mandates construing §2252(b)(2) not to apply to adult‑victim prior convictions | Ordinary canons and context supply a satisfactory construction; no need to invoke lenity | Lenity does not apply because ordinary canons (last antecedent plus context) yield a satisfactory construction |
Key Cases Cited
- Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (describing and applying the rule of the last antecedent and noting it can be overcome by contextual indicia)
- United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (applying natural construction to read a modifier across a series when sensible)
- Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (noting that the last‑antecedent rule can be rebutted by context)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (reading a modifying clause to apply to an integrated list where it sensibly does so)
- Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 (1920) (discussing when a modifier should apply to an entire series)
- Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1960) (describing the rule of lenity as a last resort after ordinary canons fail)
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (anti‑superfluity principle: Congress is presumed to give distinct meaning to different terms)
- Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (noting legislative history must be clear to overcome textual interpretation)
- Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. 425 (1799) (early application of antecedent‑modifier principles)