Locken v. Locken
797 N.W.2d 301
S.D.2011Background
- In 1973, David Locken (and his father) bought land by contract for deed; contract recorded March 7, 1973, with payments of $4,000 annually through March 1, 1998 and 7% interest on remaining balance.
- David assigned his interest to his parents in 1974; 1977–1978 sequence of warranty deed to Virgil Locken and later transfers within the family.
- Marjorie Locken died in 2001 and left the land to David; Virgil Locken died in 2006 and likewise left the land to David; 2007 affidavit of possession by the family trust; subsequent transfers to Bernard Vculek and related trusts.
- In January 2008, David filed suit against all claimants, seeking ownership interests based on Marjorie’s will and prior contract for deed; defendants asserted MRTA protection and statute-of-limitations defenses.
- The district court granted summary judgment, holding the MRTA exception did not apply and the action was barred by the ten-year contract-for-deed limitations under § 28-01-42 since the last payment’s due date occurred by 1978.
- The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding the claim is barred by statute of limitations; the MRTA exception does not apply because the relevant facts show satisfaction of the contract and the last payment date is interpreted as the date of satisfaction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does MRTA § 47-19.1-ll(l)(c) apply to preserve Locken’s claim? | Locken: contract-for-deed rights not barred by statute of limitations should survive under MRTA. | Defendants: MRTA protection does not save claims barred by § 28-01-42 unless the exception applies. | No; MRTA exception not applicable. |
| What is the operative 'due date of the last payment' for a contract-for-deed under § 28-01-42? | Locken argues the due date is the contract’s stated last payment date (1998). | Defendants argue the due date is the actual payment date when the debt is satisfied. | Ambiguous; interpret to mean date of satisfaction consistent with MRTA purpose. |
| Do §§ 28-01-15(2) and 28-01-42 interplay control when contract was satisfied before recording? | Locken says accrual under § 28-01-15(2) occurs later, so timely under § 28-01-42. | Defendants: longer § 28-01-42 period governs subject to its provisions. | The statutes are ambiguous; the court harmonizes to favor title-clearing purpose and determines the last-payment date means satisfaction date. |
| Is Langer v. Gray controlling for meaning of 'due date'? | Locken relies on Langer to define 'due date'. | Langer does not control here; context differs (tax extension). | Langer is not controlling in this contract-for-deed MRTA context. |
Key Cases Cited
- Security State Bank v. Harrington, 452 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1990) (determines accrual of action to cancel contract-for-deed under § 28-01-42)
- Langer v. Gray, 15 N.W.2d 732 (N.D. 1944) (defined meaning of 'due date' in a different statutory context)
- Ramiller v. Ramiller, 18 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1945) (statutory purposes to clear clouds on title; interpretation guidance for real property claims)
- Jennings v. Schmitz, 20 N.W.2d 897 (Iowa 1945) (tolling and applicability of special limitations for nonresidents under related Iowa provisions)
- Monast v. Manley, 293 N.W. 12 (Iowa 1940) (interrelation of mortgage and note limitations; debt-bar effect on mortgage)