Locke v. Shore
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3879
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- Florida requires interior designers practicing in commercial settings to obtain a state license; six years of combined education/internship and NCIDQ examination are required.
- The statute defines interior design (nonstructural interior elements) and creates a separate category for interior decorators; licensing targets a subset of professionals.
- Practicing interior design without a license in Florida's commercial settings is a misdemeanor with up to one year in jail and potential penalties.
- Exemptions exist: residential interior design, certain manufacturers and retail employees performing decorator services, and unlicensed employees acting under supervision of a licensed architect.
- Corporations/partnerships offering interior design in Florida must have a Florida-licensed interior designer as a partner/officer and obtain a certificate of authorization; entities with licensed principals supervise design work.
- Appellants Eva Locke, Patricia Levenson, and Barbara Gardner, all residential designers, sought to expand to commercial work; NFIB and other amici joined; the district court held the license constitutional under First Amendment, Dormant Commerce Clause, and Equal Protection/Due Process; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Florida’s license law burdening speech violates the First Amendment. | Locke claims license restricts speech to clients. | Florida regulates occupational conduct, with incidental speech impact. | No First Amendment violation; incidental regulation of conduct. |
| Whether the license law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause on its face or in effect. | Law discriminates against out-of-state designers. | Law is neutral and justified by safety benefits; burdens are not clearly excessive. | Constitutional under Dormant Commerce Clause; not discriminatory in effect. |
| Whether the license law, as applied to firms, discriminates against interstate commerce. | Firm licensing burdens out-of-state firms. | Burden is shared and not clearly excessive given local safety benefits. | Constitutional under Dormant Commerce Clause. |
| Whether the license requirement withstands rational-basis scrutiny under Due Process and Equal Protection. | License infringes fundamental right to earn a living; unequal treatment of out-of-state designers. | Profession regulation has a rational basis to protect public safety; exemptions permissible. | Rational basis; statute constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (strong presumption of validity for safety regulations; rational basis allowed)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (burden on interstate commerce analyzed against local benefits)
- Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008) (neutrally-worded regulations can have discriminatory impact; need justification)
- Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (factors for discriminatory impact and protectionist purpose)
- C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (discriminatory impact invalidates neutrally-worded laws absent non-protectionist justification)
- Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (rational basis applies to economic regulation; strong deference to legislature)
- Barzingus v. Wilheim, 306 F.3d 17 (10th Cir. 2010) ((illustrative, not cited in text))
- Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (occupational regulation with incidental speech not subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny)
- Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2009) (precedes deference to district court on factual findings)