Lloyd Meeks v. United States, 742 F.3d 841

Background

Douglas and Lloyd Meeks were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute ≥50 grams of crack and of distributing ≥5 grams of crack; both received mandatory life sentences on the conspiracy count based on prior convictions.
During jury deliberations, the jury sent two questions to the judge about (1) audio evidence (Exhibit 8) and (2) whether drug quantities for conspiracy could be aggregated over time; the court answered both questions in writing.
There is no record that either defendant or their counsel were present or given notice when the court drafted, approved, or sent the answers to the jury.
Neither defendant raised the absence-from-jury-communication issue on direct appeal; Douglas raised it in a § 2255 motion, Lloyd joined in the claim (procedurally attenuated issues differ slightly between petitions).
The district court denied § 2255 relief; this Court granted certificates of appealability limited to whether absence during the answering of jury questions warranted relief and affirmed the denial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether absence from judge–jury communication during deliberations violated right to be present	Douglas/Lloyd: absence presumptively prejudicial; defendants were not given notice or opportunity to object	Government: absence did not produce prejudice; answers either repeated instructions or were legal clarifications	Court: Claim procedurally defaulted (not raised on direct appeal) and petitioners failed to show cause for default; thus no § 2255 relief granted
Whether petitioners established cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default	Petitioners: argued prejudice from absence but did not explain cause for failing to raise on appeal	Government: procedural default bars review absent cause and prejudice; no cause shown	Court: No cause shown (no ineffective assistance claim), so court did not reach prejudice question
Whether supplemental filing of jury instructions via Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) was proper to expand the record	Petitioners: objected; 28(j) not a vehicle to supplement the record	Government: sought consideration of final instructions to assess prejudice	Court: 28(j) letter improperly sought to supplement the record; court disregarded extraneous material and found remand unnecessary because claim was procedurally defaulted
Whether communication between judge and jury in absence of defendant creates presumption of prejudice	Petitioners: relied on precedent that absent, unnotified communications create presumption of prejudice	Government: argued communications either repeated prior instructions or addressed legal issues	Court: Reiterated precedent but resolved case on procedural default; did not reach prejudice analysis substantively

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Meeks, 639 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2011) (prior appeal affirming convictions)
Ortiz v. United States, 664 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for § 2255 denials is de novo)
United States v. Mann, 685 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2012) (defendant's right to presence at critical stages)
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (U.S. 1983) (right to personal presence at critical stages)
Stewart v. Nix, 972 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1992) (communication between judge and jury without defendant or notice creates presumption of prejudice; nonprejudicial when repeating instructions or addressing law)
Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2005) (issues raised first in § 2255 are procedurally defaulted)
Charboneau v. United States, 702 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2013) (to overcome procedural default, petitioner must show cause and actual prejudice)
Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2011) (if no cause shown for procedural default, court need not reach prejudice)
Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) is not a mechanism to supplement the record)