Liz Tate v. Tate Transportation, Inc.
33974-2
| Wash. Ct. App. | Dec 6, 2016Background
- Liz Tate worked as safety director for Tate Transportation after the company was sold in 2008 to Ray and Chris Nulph; her pay was reduced to part-time but benefits continued.
- Tate alleges Chris repeatedly told her her job was secure "as long as I wanted," and she agreed to give one year’s notice before leaving.
- In 2012 Chris signed a company letter (for a visa) stating Tate agreed to stay as an employee at least until January 2017 and describing her role and salary.
- In May 2014 the company lost major customers; Chris asked Tate to return to full-time work, which she declined, and she was terminated three days later for alleged cost-cutting and performance/behavior reasons.
- Tate sued for wrongful termination, claiming an implied contract (with her promise to give one-year notice as consideration) that required termination only for cause; the trial court granted summary judgment for the employer on statute-of-frauds grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an enforceable employment agreement existed that limited termination to for-cause | Tate: oral assurances plus letter created a contract; her promise to give one-year notice was consideration converting at-will employment | Tate Transp.: no enforceable contract; any oral promise for >1 year must be in writing under the statute of frauds | No enforceable agreement existed; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether the writing (letter to Homeland Security) satisfies the statute of frauds | Tate: the signed letter is a sufficient writing showing terms and duration | Tate Transp.: the letter lacks essential terms (consideration, notice obligation, explicit for-cause term) | Letter insufficient: it omits the one-year notice/consideration and other essential terms |
| Whether Tate's promise to give one-year notice constituted consideration to alter at-will status | Tate: her promise was additional consideration supporting a for-cause agreement | Tate Transp.: promise alleged but not in writing; therefore falls within statute of frauds | Court treats the promise as establishing >1-year term triggering statute; absent written terms, no enforceable contract |
| Whether factual disputes (e.g., actual reason for termination) precluded summary judgment | Tate: disputed facts about motive and cause of firing create triable issues | Tate Transp.: threshold legal defect (statute of frauds) defeats claim regardless of motive facts | Court did not reach motive dispute because the statute-of-frauds failure disposes of the case |
Key Cases Cited
- Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29 (review of summary judgment standard)
- Trimble v. Wash. State Univ., 140 Wn.2d 88 (summary judgment and viewing facts for nonmoving party)
- Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219 (at-will employment and contracts altering termination rights)
- Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wn.2d 887 (termination for cause requires agreement or additional consideration)
- Smith v. Twohy, 70 Wn.2d 721 (statute of frauds writing must contain essential elements)
- Family Med. Bldg., Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 104 Wn.2d 105 (essential contract elements for a writing)
- DePhillips v. Zolt Constr. Co., Inc., 136 Wn.2d 26 (employment writing must identify parties and job responsibilities)