Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment
76 A.3d 1076
Md.2013Background
- Gail B. Litz owned a 140-acre property with Lake Bonnie and operated a profitable campground; she alleged long‑running contamination of lake and groundwater originating from Goldsboro’s storm/drainage systems and failing septic systems.
- The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) and Caroline County documented contamination in the 1980s–1990s; a 1996 Consent Order required Goldsboro to remediate but Goldsboro largely failed to comply.
- Litz filed suit in 2010 (Third Amended Complaint) asserting negligence, trespass, private and public nuisance, inverse condemnation, injunctive and other claims against the Town, County, State agencies, and MDE; she alleged ongoing discharges that destroyed the campground and devalued the property.
- Trial court dismissed all claims against State and County defendants (sovereign immunity / MTCA issues) and dismissed claims against the Town as time‑barred; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed on statute‑of‑limitations grounds.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether the nuisance, negligence, trespass, and inverse‑condemnation claims were barred by the three‑year statute of limitations, focusing solely on accrual/continuing‑violation issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether nuisance claims are time‑barred (permanent v. temporary) | Litz: contamination was ongoing; temporary nuisance theory allows recovery for invasions within 3 years | Town: nuisance was permanent/continuous and accrual occurred by 1996 | Held: Nuisance claims are time‑barred — facts show likely permanent nuisance; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether negligence claims are time‑barred (continuing tort doctrine) | Litz: Town owed continuing duty and continuously breached it, tolling accrual for damages within 3 years before filing | Town: Litz knew of injury by 1996; only continuing effects exist, not continuing torts — accrual in 1996 | Held: Reversed as to negligence — complaint permits inference of ongoing duties/breaches; not clearly time‑barred on face of complaint |
| Whether trespass claims are time‑barred (continuing invasion) | Litz: approval/maintenance of septic/storm systems caused continuing invasions into her land | Town: injury and its cause known by 1996; claims accrued then | Held: Reversed as to trespass — pleadings permit inference of continuing invasions within the limitations period |
| When inverse‑condemnation claim accrued | Litz: accrual may be at foreclosure (May 2010) — gradual/continuous taking stabilized at foreclosure | Defendants: accrual when she knew of contamination (1996); claim therefore untimely | Held: Reversed as to inverse condemnation — taking may have been continuing with a complete/stabilized taking as late as foreclosure; accrual not clearly before limitations period on complaint face |
Key Cases Cited
- MacBride v. Pishvaian, 937 A.2d 233 (Md. 2007) (distinguishes continuing‑harm vs. continuing‑violation; statute‑of‑limitations tolling requires continuing unlawful acts)
- Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 404 A.2d 1064 (Md. 1979) (permanent nuisance accrues when permanency becomes manifest to a reasonably prudent person)
- Electro‑Nucleonics v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 554 A.2d 804 (Md. 1989) (applies §5‑101 three‑year limitations to inverse condemnation)
- Converge Servs. Chp., LLC v. Curran, 860 A.2d 871 (Md. 2004) (motion‑to‑dismiss standard — accept well‑pled facts and reasonable inferences for non‑moving party)
- Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d 677 (Md. 1981) (discovery rule tolls accrual until plaintiff knows or should know of injury)
- Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 291 A.2d 64 (Md. 1972) (continuing‑violation doctrine permits recovery for damages within three years prior to suit when violations are continuing)
- United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1947) (in gradual takings, statute of limitations begins when taking stabilizes/becomes permanent)